NCAA: A LESSON IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND ANTITRUST
REGULATION
LINDSAY A. OLIVER*
INTRODUCTION – THE PRE-GAME SHOW
The National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) celebrated its
centennial in March 2006, and it seems to have received a generous gift from the
U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”): a free pass enabling the Association to
purchase a solution to a costly antitrust problem. In August 2005, in an
unprecedented move, the NCAA acquired its long-time rival postseason men’s
basketball tournament, the National Invitation Tournament (“NIT”), in a settlement
of an antitrust case brought by the Metropolitan Intercollegiate Basketball
Association (“MIBA”), the owner-operator of the NIT.1 The NCAA has called the
moment a “historic day for men’s college basketball.”2 Whether this “historic” event
will remain undisturbed by antitrust law is unclear. Although legal issues abound, the
DOJ has yet to challenge the settlement’s legitimacy.
Splashed across newsstands for several months, the antitrust suit, first filed in
2001, finally went to trial on August 1, 2005.3 The MIBA told the jury that, in order
to protect its cash cow “March Madness,”4 the NCAA was purposefully ruining the
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NCAA purchases NIT events to end four-year legal battle, THE NCAA NEWS, Aug. 29, 2005,
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/newsdetail?WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/
NCAA/NCAA+News/NCAA+News+Online/2005/Division+I/NCAA+purchases+NIT+events+
to+end+four-year+legal+battle+-+8-29-05+NCAA+News (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter
THE NCAA NEWS].
1

2 Press Release, NCAA Pub. & Media Relations, NCAA and MIBA End Litigation; NIT
Tournaments
Purchased
(Aug.
17,
2005),
http://www2.ncaa.org/media_and_events/press_room/2005/august/20050817_mibanit.html (last
visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Press Release].

Mark Alesia, Antitrust case puts NCAA on defense; NIT suit over tournament will go to court Monday, THE
INDIANAPOLIS STAR, July 31, 2005, at 1A [hereinafter Alesia].
3

4

The NCAA March Madness tournament accounts for at least 90% of the Association’s revenue. Id.
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NIT in violation of federal antitrust laws.5 It claimed that the NCAA “willfully,
deliberately set out to get a monopoly, to eliminate competition, to make it
impossible to compete,” by promulgating rules requiring NCAA member schools to
accept a bid to March Madness over an invitation to any other postseason
tournament.6
This Article will explore the relevant antitrust issues under §§ 1 and 2 of the
Sherman Act presented by the two Associations in the litigation proceedings, as well
as the practical implications and legal issues under § 7 of the Clayton Act raised by
the settlement itself. The analysis herein aspires to present a complete picture of the
interaction between the NCAA and the MIBA in relation to antitrust law and those
principles the laws were designed to uphold.
I. TRANSACTION HISTORY AND BACKGROUND – SLOW MOTION INSTANT
REPLAY
Thorough analysis of this particularly newsworthy acquisition initially
requires an examination of the unique and thought-provoking context out of which
it was born, including a close look at the organizations involved, their motivations,
and their storied pasts.
A. The Players
1. NCAA
a. Origins and Cartel Theory
The association now known as the NCAA was formed in 1906 in response
to a growing number of injuries and deaths among college football players7 that
spawned from both a lack of protective rules in the game and a failure to enforce the
Associated
Press,
NIT
sues
NCAA,
ATHLON
SPORTS,
Aug.
2,
2005,
http://www.athlonsports.com/college-basketball/6733/nit-sues-ncaa (last visited Oct. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter NIT sues NCAA].
5

6

Id.

The History of the NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/history.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006)
[hereinafter History of the NCAA]. In 1905, the annual tally of serious injuries incurred in college
football was 159 and eighteen young men died in that year alone. ARTHUR A. FLEISHER III ET AL.,
THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, A STUDY IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR 38-39
(1992) [hereinafter FLEISHER ET AL.].
7
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rules that were in place.8 The violence had become so severe that it not only
drew the attention of the general public, but also that of President Theodore
Roosevelt, who, in the fall of 1905, called together representatives from three of the
most prominent schools—Harvard, Yale, and Princeton—to discuss potential
solutions.9 The prevalence of violence in college football caused several schools to
drop or suspend their programs that year.10 Finally, after several conventions,
delegates from sixty-two schools voted to form the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association of the United States (“IAAUS”), aimed at curbing the crisis and
establishing rules for the game.11 The IAAUS was officially constituted on March 31,
1906; it changed its name to the National Collegiate Athletic Association in 1910.12
In its adolescent years (that is, up to 1920), the NCAA expanded its influence
beyond the football field to reach eight more college sports, including basketball.13
But what some refer to as the “golden age” of college athletics occurred during the
period from 1920 to 1950, when college athletics grew into a national
preoccupation.14 The NCAA’s role up to that point consisted primarily of record
In the late 1800s, football games became notorious for their haphazard rules, violence, and
controversy regarding eligibility requirements. Id. at 37. Athletic clubs hired professional athletes
(also known as “ringers”) to play in college games, and no standardized set of rules prevailed across
teams. Id. The most dangerous technique utilized in that era of football, which was responsible for
much of the negative public sentiment and was eventually outlawed, was the “flying wedge,” invented
in 1892 by Lorin F. Deland, a construction engineer. PAUL R. LAWRENCE, UNSPORTSMANLIKE
CONDUCT, THE NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION AND THE BUSINESS OF COLLEGE
FOOTBALL 4-5 (1987) [hereinafter LAWRENCE]. Deland’s “flying wedge” involved a more powerful
variation of the “V-trick” or “wedge” that had been utilized since 1884, calling for seven players to
interlock their arms and move in a “V” pointed toward the goal line, with the ball-carrier protected
within. Id. Deland’s version added a twenty-yard running start to the already dangerous formation,
causing dramatic increases in game injuries. Id.
8

9 The discussion took place on October 9, 1905, and, though not accomplishing much, did provide
for the beginning of dialogue and open acknowledgement of the issues. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note
7, at 39. The conversation covered potential solutions such as means of enforcement of current rules
and also the creation of new rules that might stem the tide of violence in the sport. Id.
10

These schools included Columbia, Northwestern, California, and Stanford. Id.

11

History of the NCAA, supra note 7.

12

Id.

13

FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 42.

Id. The “golden age” refers to the exponential rise in the popularity of primarily college football
between 1920 and 1950, where many stadiums were being built and expanded to keep up with
attendance growth. Id. at 42-43.
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keeping, conducting national championship tournaments in several sports, and
promoting uniform playing rules.15 Although some guidelines had been adopted in
the 1920s regarding player eligibility, recruiting, and financial aid, the NCAA did not
actively enforce those rules; instead, enforcement was left in the hands of the
universities.16 This approach, however, proved to be highly ineffective given the
divergent interests of competing universities.17
Though attempts only a few years earlier had failed,18 measures taken by the
NCAA in 1952 signaled a permanent change in the organization’s character from
merely a game-defining and “amateurism”-promoting19 association of member
15 E. Woodrow Eckard, The NCAA Cartel and Competitive Balance in College Football, 13 REV. INDUS.
ORG. 347, 348 (1998) [hereinafter Eckard].
16

Id. Eckard notes that “the NCAA’s role remained ‘advisory, at best’” and that the
member institutions specifically forbade NCAA enforcement.
The initial
constitution contained the following language: “The acceptance of a definite
statement of eligibility rules shall not be a requirement of membership in this
Association. The constituted authorities of each institution shall decide on
methods of preventing the violation of the principles laid down . . . .

Id. at 348 n.2 (quoting JACK FALLA, NCAA: THE VOICE OF COLLEGE SPORTS 22 (1981)). In
1921, the NCAA amended its constitution to reflect a philosophy of establishing strict,
uniform laws of eligibility and amateurism, and adoption of those rules by members, as
opposed to the original stated purpose of promoting the adoption of recommended measures.
LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 24. Some schools viewed the changes as an “attempt to
supersede [the NCAA’s] original purpose by establishing a system of control over all of
college athletics,” and threatened to withdraw. Id.
17 See id. at 23. The violations continued despite the NCAA’s efforts to condemn those schools that
disregarded the Amateur and Eligibility Codes. Id.

In 1948, members of the Association voted the “Sanity Code” into the NCAA constitution; this
Code consisted of rules on amateurism, financial aid, recruiting, and eligibility, and was accompanied,
for the first time, by a self-created, association-level enforcement mechanism. FLEISHER ET AL., supra
note 7, at 47. Because of the severity of its only punishment—termination of a school’s
membership—and the requirement of a two-thirds vote of NCAA members to proceed with the
termination, the Code was rarely invoked, the sanction was never imposed, and it was finally repealed
in 1951. Id. at 48-49.
18

Several economists have criticized the NCAA’s prizing of “amateurism;” as one critic notes, “Many
casual observers believe that the NCAA endorsed the participation of amateurs to keep intercollegiate
athletics ‘pure,’ but we cannot ignore the fact that it was cheaper to allow amateur rather than
professional participation.” LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 22.

19
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schools, to a powerful enforcement machine.20 Economists note this point in
the NCAA’s history as that in which it effectively became an economic cartel, setting
firm prices on the inputs of compensation for student-athletes; limiting recruiting
efforts, including forbidding advertising21 to attract recruits; and restricting output by
fixing the maximum number of seasons each athlete could play, as well as the
number of postseason games in which teams could participate.22

In 1952, the NCAA promulgated a new code containing rules governing player eligibility, financial
aid, and recruiting. Eckard, supra note 15, at 349. As part of its new scheme, the NCAA also created
a Membership Committee and an Infractions Subcommittee that were given the responsibility of
enforcing NCAA rules and investigating potential violations. FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 50.
The NCAA Council, to which members of the Membership Committee belonged, was vested with
operational control; member schools were reduced to a final appellate group. Id. The committees
had the power to punish breaching members though a variety of means, including probation; private
and public reprimands; bans on participation in televised events; reduction in the number of
scholarships allocated to the breaching member; and ultimately, the schedule boycott, sometimes
referred to as the “death penalty.” Eckard, supra note 15, at 349.

20

Typical cartel behavior includes restricting advertising in an effort to restrain competition and keep
costs down for all participants. Id. at 349 n.6.

21

22 Id. at 349 (supporting the notion that this marked the time of true cartel formation); LAWRENCE,
supra note 8, at 38 (claiming that around this time, the NCAA took steps associated with typical cartel
formation). Reasons for classifying the NCAA as a cartel include: setting maximum prices paid for
athletes; regulating the quantity of student athletes each school can effectively purchase; controlling
the duration and intensity of schools’ usage of athletes; periodically informing members regarding
transactions, costs, sales techniques, and market conditions; often pooling and distributing portions of
cartel profits; and policing member behavior and imposing penalties on members who violate cartel
rules. James V. Koch, Intercollegiate Athletics: An Economic Explanation, 64 SOC. SCI. Q. 360, 361 (1983);
see also FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 50 (noting the extinction of the free market within which
schools competed for student athletes). Economic cartel theory explains why the NCAA was able to
overcome the opposition to self-enforcement at this particular time in history:

By agreeing on an enforcement mechanism, schools gave up more of their
individual control over their programs. Schools gaining the most by breaking the
rules had the most to lose. On the other side, by restricting input payments, the
enforcement mechanism would benefit schools financially. Although college
athletics had always enjoyed popularity, the 1920-50 period witnessed a boom in
the demand for college sports. As the 1950s dawned, college sports began to tap
the revenues from television exposure. As cartel theory suggests, the return to
producers from collusion on inputs and outputs is greater as the demand for the
final product grows. The demand growth for college sports over this period
increased the benefits of an effective enforcement mechanism across institutions. . .
[Consistent with] the theory of the relative distribution of cartel rewards . . . [w]hile
restricting payments to student athletes, the rules allowed athletic powers with
existing physical and brand-name assets to capitalize on these assets. The schools

12
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During the 1950s to 1970s, the NCAA, enjoying increasing national demand
for its college football and basketball contests23 and having gained a newfound police
power over its members, began promulgating what is now a colossal book of rules.24
These rules conveniently enabled the Association to significantly reduce the costs of
recruiting and maintaining student athletes25 and provided it with more effective
means of discovering noncompliance.26 Proponents of increased regulatory control
over institutional spending asserted that such limitation would achieve “parity”
with better facilities and academic and athletic reputations (usually in the North and
the Midwest) had a distinct advantage over the schools with up-and-coming athletic
and academic programs (usually in the South and the Southwest).
FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 51.
23

See id. at 52-55.

24 The NCAA 2005-06 Division I Manual is comprised of 510 pages of rules. The manual is available
at http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2005-06/2005-06_d1_manual.pdf
(last visited Oct. 2, 2006). During the 1960s and 1970s, the NCAA solidified its control over its
members by closing loopholes in existing regulations and adding many new rules, as well as
strengthening its enforcement procedures. See Eckard, supra note 15, at 350.

An example would include limiting a student-athlete’s financial aid to “tuition and fees, room and
board, books and . . . $15 a month laundry money.” LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 60 (quoting NCAA
PROCEEDINGS 299 (1957)) (alteration in original). Upon conducting a year-long study and learning
that members were spending large amounts of money to recruit the best athletes, the NCAA Council
determined at its 1957 convention that competition between the schools should be limited to control
costs. Id. at 59. Pursuant to that aim, a constitutional amendment was passed that limited recruiting
visits, disallowed benefits like transportation for a recruit’s relatives, and prevented “booster”
organizations from participating in recruiting. Id.
25

Creating means of monitoring member activities is also one of the classic key components of an
effective cartel. BRAD R. HUMPHREYS & JANE E. RUSESKI, FINANCING INTERCOLLEGIATE
ATHLETICS: THE ROLE OF MONITORING AND ENFORCING NCAA RECRUITING REGULATIONS 5-10
(2005), available at https://netfiles.uiuc.edu/brh/www/papers/financing_athletics.pdf (discussing
Stigler’s theory of oligopoly in the context of the NCAA and noting that “[t]he major functions of a
cartel are (1) to establish the rules of the cartel; and (2) to ‘self-police’, that is to monitor each
member’s conduct to ensure that everyone abides by the agreement”); see also U.S. Department of
Justice & Federal Trade Commission, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 2.1 (1997), available at
www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg.pdf (noting the importance of detecting and punishing
deviations in ensuring profitability of coordinated interaction) [hereinafter GUIDELINES]. The NCAA
accomplished this through a 1957 rule that required each member school to be responsible for the
administration of funds distributed to recruits. Id. (citing NCAA PROCEEDINGS 299 (1957)). Further,
a 1959 rule compelled members giving financial aid to student-athletes to put the total amount in
written form; this rule also aided the discovery and enforcement efforts. Id. at 61 (citing NCAA
PROCEEDINGS 249 (1959)).
26
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among schools competing for athletes.27 Many are critical of those assertions,28
however, especially since competitive balance declined considerably once cartel
enforcement began via the NCAA’s effective sanctions of 1952.29
In response to conflict over television revenue distribution plans and the
diverging interests of smaller and larger schools, which threatened the NCAA’s cartel
profit maximizing capabilities,30 the Association divided its members into three
competitive and legislative divisions in 1973.31 In 1997, The NCAA granted an
increased level of autonomy to each division, and implemented its current
governance structure.32
b. NCAA Today: A Brief Note on Its Commercialization
Today the NCAA has become a vast organization staffed by about 350
employees and headquartered in Indianapolis.33 Its active membership has increased
enormously since its early years, from 362 active members in 1950 to over one
thousand in 2004.34 Along with the growth of the organization itself, criticism of
NAND HART-NIBBRIG & CLEMENT COTTINGHAM, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY
SPORTS 24-25 (1986).
27

28

OF

COLLEGE

See, e.g., id.

29 See Eckard, supra note 15, at 359-63 (performing statistical analyses of balance levels for pre- and
post-enforcement periods over the full period as well as shorter periods).
30 See LAWRENCE, supra note 8, at 97-98. The schools’ differing interests regarding the division of
football revenues threatened the smooth and efficient workings of the cartel; cartel members with
differing objectives did not have an incentive to approve a policy that benefited only one of the
members when there was no correlating benefit to the others, rendering the collective decisionmaking process much more difficult and costly. See id. at 97. By organizing itself into distinct
divisions, the cartel not only reduced the cost of collective decision-making, but also erected barriers
to entry into Division I athletics by imposing restrictions on schools wanting to join. Joel G. Maxcy,
The 1997 Restructuring of the NCAA: A Transactions Cost Explanation, in ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE
SPORTS 11, 16-17 (John Fizel & Rodney Fort eds., 2004) [hereinafter Maxcy].
31

See History of the NCAA, supra note 7.

32 Id. See generally Maxcy, supra note 30, at 20-22 (explaining this organizational overhaul in terms of
economic motivation and transaction cost analysis).
33

See History of the NCAA, supra note 7.

2004
NCAA
Membership
Report,
available
at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/membership_report/2004/2004_ncaa_membership_repo
34
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the NCAA has also escalated, with many condemning the commercialization of
“amateur” college athletics that has become readily observable in recent decades.35
The “show me the money”36 mentality has certainly infiltrated the NCAA’s
operation, as evidenced by the staggering television revenue figures from the
Association’s men’s basketball championships.37 While the NCAA is a “not-forprofit” organization, its motivation to increase member profitability through
collusion or otherwise is no less real; such profits are manifested in the form of
subsidies to general university expenses, office facilities, administration and coaches’
salaries, and the like, instead of shareholder returns.38

rt.pdf [hereinafter NCAA Membership Report]. This represents a 184% increase. Overall
membership (inclusive of active, provisional, conference, corresponding, and affiliate) experienced an
even greater 234% increase over the period from 387 members in 1950 to 1,292 in 2004. Id.
See, e.g., Paul D. Staudohar & Barry Zepel, The Impact on Higher Education in Big-Time College Sports, in
ECONOMICS OF COLLEGE SPORTS 35, 46-47 (John Fizel and Rodney Fort eds., 2004). The NCAA’s
stated purpose is to “maintain intercollegiate athletics as an integral part of the educational program
and the athlete as an integral part of the student body;” in reality, however, the NCAA is more of a
professional league in that 80% of its revenues come from television contracts and it enjoys lavish
headquarters and lucrative corporate sponsorships, but in the absence of salary woes and income
taxes. Id. at 39; see KNIGHT FOUNDATION COMMISSION ON INTERCOLLEGIATE ATHLETICS, A CALL
TO ACTION: RECONNECTING COLLEGE SPORTS AND HIGHER EDUCATION 19-21 (2001), available at
http://knightcommission.org/about/knight_commission_reports/.
35

36

JERRY MCGUIRE (Sony Pictures Home Entertainment 1996).

The NCAA’s contract with CBS granting exclusive television rights for the Division I Men’s
Basketball Championships became effective in September of 2002 and provided for payments over
the next 11 years; the agreement also gives the NCAA the right to renegotiate the contract after the
initial eight years. See NCAA Membership Report, supra note 34, at 57 n.12. The NCAA received its
first payment of $360 million at the end of the 2003 fiscal year and it received $389 million at the end
of the 2004 fiscal year. Id. at 57. It expects to take in at least an additional $5.211 billion through
2013. Id. The CBS contract carries a guaranteed minimum of $6.0 billion over the course of the 11year agreement. Id. The argument that college sports have been commercialized is strong, given that
last year alone, television and marketing rights fees accounted for 86% of the NCAA’s revenues, while
championships accounted for 10%, for a grand total of approximately $452 million. Id. at 22.
Projected revenues for the 2008-2009 fiscal year approach $650 million. Id.
37

FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 21. Cartel rents are thereby masked by member schools
accounting practices, as “profits” take the form of other balance sheet items that are maximized. Id.;
see generally Press Release, NCAA Pub. & Media Relations, Athletics Budgets Continue to Increase in
Divisions
I
and
II
(May
3,
2005),
http://www2.ncaa.org/media_and_events/press_room/2005/may/20050503_revenues_expenses_rl
s.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) (discussing the biennial NCAA study of spending on college sports).

38
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Though the revenue figures speak for themselves,39 the NCAA continues
to insist that any allegations of improper motives are false40 and continues to make
efforts to improve the public perception of the Association.41 It is, however, unlikely
to convince the nation that college sports have not been commercialized, and that
some measure of amateurism has not been lost forever.42
2. MIBA/NIT – Origins
The MIBA, which owned and operated the NIT, was the face across the
table in the settlement at issue.43 The MIBA is comprised of five New York area
39

See supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.

40 See Press Release, Wallace I. Renfro, Senior Advisor to the NCAA President, NCAA President Calls
for Value-Based Budgeting for Intercollegiate Athletics Programs, (Jan. 8, 2005),
http://www.ncaa.org/wps/portal/legacysiteviewer?CONTENT_URL=http://www2.ncaa.org/portal
/media_and_events/press_room/2005/january/20050108_soa_speech.html (last visited Oct. 2,
2005). President Myles Brand therein attempts to refute “myths” such as “[c]ollege sports is more
about sports than college;” “[c]ollege sports is only about the money . . . . ;” and “[a]mateurism itself is
a myth.” Id. He opines that “education is the goal, not sports entertainment,” and “[a]mateurism is
not about how much; it is about why. It’s not about the money; it is about the motivation.” Id. He
stresses that the “myths” exaggerate the problems and that the primary mission of the NCAA is “the
education of the student and the student-athlete.” Id.

NCAA EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE, STRATEGIC PLAN 7 (2004), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/planning/StrategicPlan5.pdf.
“Perceptions of the Association and
Intercollegiate Athletics,” found in section five of the provision entitled “3- to 5-Year OutcomeOriented Goals,” reads: “The public will gain a greater understanding of and confidence in the
integrity of intercollegiate athletics and will more readily support its values.” Id. Objective 5.2 goes
on to state: “Increase the public’s confidence in the Association as a whole.” Id.
41

42 See College Recruiting: Are Student Athletes Being Protected?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Trade,
and Consumer Protection of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 108th Cong. 1, 24 (2004) (statement of
Hon. Cliff Stearns, Chairman, House Comm. on Energy and Commerce) (noting that “[c]ommerce is
certainly implicated” in the NCAA’s activities and that college athletics is “big business”). The
Chairman pointed out that the NCAA has multiple products that are sold to cable and television
networks for hundreds of millions of dollars each year. Id. at 1. He also observed that schools jump
to other conferences in pursuit of bigger contracts and that the NCAA is sued over distribution of
funds from the tournaments and bowl games. Id. Others noted that college athletics are no longer an
“altruistic endeavor of not-for-profit institutions of higher learning” and that the lives of skilled
athletes “become a commodity.” Id. at 24; see Role of Antitrust Law in Amateur Athletics is Examined at
ABA Meeting, 74 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. 341 (Apr. 9, 1998) (debating whether the current
system “exploits” college athletes).
43 See Press Release, supra note 2. The NCAA purchased the rights to operate both the preseason and
postseason National Invitation Tournaments. Id.
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schools: New York University, Fordham University, Manhattan College, Wagner
College, and St. John’s University,44 all of which are themselves members of the
NCAA.45 After several years of intersectional doubleheaders and big match-up
games in men’s basketball,46 the post-season NIT was initiated in 1938 and was
considered to be the original tournament producing America’s “national
champion.”47
3. Competition between NIT and NCAA Championships
Although the NCAA postseason men’s basketball tournament began just one
year later, in 1939,48 the NIT maintained its national title status until 1960.49 In the
interim years, both organizations enjoyed increasing demand for the sport.50 For the
benefit of the Red Cross during World War II, from 1943-1945 the NIT and NCAA
tournament winners played against each other in unofficial national championship
games, with the NCAA title-holders sweeping all three matches.51 Although NCAA
Id. These schools are all New York colleges and universities, and reportedly had run the NIT over
the years with a purpose of “keeping basketball for the city.” Matthew Roberts, NIT Sues NCAA on
SPORTSLAW
NEWS,
Antitrust
Claim,
MARK’S
http://www.sportslawnews.com/archive/Articles%202001/NITNCAAsuit.htm (last visited Oct. 2,
2006) [hereinafter Roberts].
44

45 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The
court also noted that the MIBA itself is an affiliated member of the NCAA. Id. at 566.
46 Basketball’s first intersectional doubleheader was held at Madison Square Garden on December 19,
1934.
Infoplease.com, From the First NIT to the NCAA Final Four,
http://www.infoplease.com/ipsa/A0747186.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Infoplease].
47

Alesia, supra note 3.

The NCAA tournament was originally organized by the National Association of Basketball Coaches
(“NABC”) who asked the NCAA to assume responsibility for running it the following year.
Infoplease, supra note 46.
48

FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 55-60. This turn of events was presumably due to the NCAA
Executive Committee’s adoption of a rule in 1960 advising members that, if chosen “at large” for the
NCAA tournament, the schools “should” participate in it over the postseason NIT. Id. at 55-56.
Even after ceding premier national championship status to the NCAA, the NIT was still able to
consistently attract talented teams to its tournament until NCAA tournament expansion in the 1970s.
Alesia, supra note 3.
49

50 See FLEISHER ET AL., supra note 7, at 42 (observing that college athletics expanded from a “small
cottage industry” in 1920 to “nationwide preoccupation” in the 1940s).
51

Infoplease, supra note 46.
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member schools were allowed to participate in both postseason tournaments
until 1953,52 the MIBA contended that during the mid-1940s the NCAA began to
look for ways “to ‘curb’ competition from the Postseason NIT,”53 resulting primarily
in the following trends in the NCAA tournament’s operation:
(1) Bracket Expansion. The NCAA playoff tournament, which originally
included eight teams, was expanded in 1953 to include twenty-two teams.54
Expansions continued such that, in 1979, the NCAA invited forty teams to the
tournament; in 1980, forty-eight; in 1982, fifty-two; in 1984, fifty-three; in 1985,
sixty-four;55 and finally, beginning in July 2001, the NCAA invited sixty-five teams to
the tournament.56 The MIBA contends that this series of expansions was aimed at
absorbing all of the most talented teams, specifically to the NIT’s detriment.57 It
further alleged that, by deliberately preventing talented teams from participating in
the NIT, the NCAA intentionally harmed the quality of the MIBA’s product.58 The
NCAA, however, posits that it was merely undergoing those expansions to keep up
with consumer demand and the increasing number of member men’s basketball
teams.59
(2) Self-promoting Rules. Also during these years, the NCAA adopted a series
of rules that the MIBA claimed effectively eliminated competition for postseason
basketball, beginning with its “One Postseason Tournament Rule” in 1953; this rule
required dual invitee members to choose one tournament in which they would
participate.60 Its “Expected Participation Rule” was added in 1961, further
52

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 566 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

53

Id.

54

Id.

55

Infoplease, supra note 46.

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568. The resulting sixty-five team playoff
system has continued since 2001 and represents the current structure of the tournament. Id.

56

57

Id. at 567.

58

Id.

59

Id.

60

Id. at 566.
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encouraging NCAA member schools to give priority to the NCAA tournament over
the NIT.61 In 1981, this rule was revised and the infamous “Commitment to
Participate Rule” was born, destined to become one of the primary points of
contention in the suit filed by the MIBA.62
B. The Tip-off: Litigation
1. Initial Filing – A Long Road Ahead
Decades after the contested rules were promulgated by the NCAA,63 the
MIBA filed its complaint in 2001.64 It alleged that over multiple decades the NCAA
had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act65 through its promulgation of several
rules that operated to unfairly restrict competition from other men’s college
basketball postseason tournaments.66 These “Postseason Rules” included the
Commitment to Participate Rule; the End of Playing Season Rule; the One
Postseason Tournament Rule; the “automatic qualification procedure,” whereby all
winners of the thirty-one conferences had to participate in the NCAA tournament;

61

See supra note 49.

62

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567.

63 The NCAA criticized the MIBA’s delayed response to the Postseason Rules. Gregory L. Curtner,
attorney for the NCAA, reportedly “accused the NIT of exercising a form of courthouse bad
sportsmanship by waiting until 2001 to file its lawsuit, decades after its troubles began.” NIT sues
NCAA, supra note 5.
64

Id.

65

15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (2006).

66

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565, 568.
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and the bracket expansions.67 The MIBA also alleged tortious interference with a
contract.68
2. NCAA Rule 31.2.1.1
The language of the primary rule at issue is deceptively short, yet its alleged
effect on the NIT was devastating. Bylaw 31.2.1.1, entitled “Commitment to
Participate,” reads: “Eligible members in a sport who are not also members of the
National Association of Intercollegiate Athletics will participate (if selected) in the
NCAA championship or in no postseason competition in that sport.”69
The current rule is an evolutionary product of the original “Expected
Participation Rule” adopted in 1961.70 Presumably the “suggestion” of the 1961 rule
escalated to a “requirement” after five member schools ignored the Executive
Committee’s guidance by declining NCAA invitations in order to play in the

See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004);
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568. The Commitment to Participate Rule is
discussed at length in Part II(b)(ii), infra. The End of Season Playing Rule mandates that the NIT
conclude prior to the end of the NCAA playoff tournament; the One Postseason Tournament Rule
prevents teams invited to the NCAA tournament from participating in both postseason tournaments.
Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568.
67

68 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565. The Court did not discuss this claim,
nor did it mention the particular contract in question. As this issue is beyond the scope of this
Article, it will not be analyzed herein.
69 NCAA BYLAW 31.2.1.1, reprinted in 2005-06 NCAA Division I Manual, at 426 (2005), available at
http://www.ncaa.org/library/membership/division_i_manual/2005-06/2005-06_d1_manual.pdf.
An exception within this rule is granted to schools who are also members of the National Association
of Intercollegiate Athletics (“NAIA”); a joint-declaration program has been established with the
NCAA and NAIA whereby dual members are allowed to elect whether to participate in the NAIA
championship, the NCAA championship, or no postseason competition in each of their respective
sports. See id.
70

See supra text accompanying notes 61-62.
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postseason NIT in 1962,71 and after Marquette University’s head coach Al McGuire
openly defied the “suggestion” in 1970.72
Although the Commitment to Participate Rule has been revised several times
since 1981, none of those revisions carried much significance.73 As such, the NCAA
rule has remained in effect and virtually unchanged since its inception, despite
internal recommendations for its removal74 and despite its effect of limiting NIT
participation to teams that rank far lower than the vast majority of the NCAA
tournament teams.75
3. The MIBA’s Claims
The MIBA asserted three claims against the NCAA,76 two of which will be
analyzed in this Article. First, it contended that the NCAA violated § 1 of the
Sherman Act77 through its promulgation of the Postseason Rules.78 The MIBA
contended that the rules themselves are anticompetitive and constitute proscribed
“unreasonable restraints of trade” in that, together with the NCAA’s bracket
71 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 566. The five schools included Loyola
University of Chicago, Dayton University, Mississippi State, St. John’s University, and The University
of Houston; Dayton University had also declined an NCAA invitation in favor of the NIT’s in the
previous year. Id.

Alesia, supra note 3. Angered and offended by the (presumably low) seed given his extremely
talented team in the 1970 NCAA tournament, Coach McGuire pulled his team out of the tournament
and instead played his team in the NIT. Id.
72

73

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 567.

The NCAA Division I Championships/Competition Cabinet issued a report in July of 2000
recommending deletion of the rule; the rationale was explained as follows: “In the spirit of
deregulation, institutions should be vested with the responsibility of selecting postseason competition
opportunities.” Report of the NCAA Division I Championships/Competition Cabinet, Item
2(b)(6)(g) (July 5, 2000).

74

See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568 (stating that “there is no material
dispute that the vast majority of the NCAA teams rank above the best NIT teams”).
75

76

See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.

77

15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006).

78 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 569; Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v.
NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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expansion, they operate to diminish competition from postseason79 tournaments
sponsored by other entities, including the NIT.80
The MIBA also alleged that the NCAA violated § 2 of the Sherman Act81 by
using those rules not only to reduce competition among Division I men’s basketball
tournaments, but specifically to realize or attempt to realize monopoly power in that
market.82
4. Motions for Summary Judgment
Both parties filed motions for summary judgment in an attempt to achieve a
relatively quick and inexpensive resolution.83 The MIBA filed on its claims under § 1

The MIBA also claimed that the rules inhibited competition from preseason tournaments, including
the NIT preseason tournament. Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565. The
MIBA sued to block proposed rules that would count each preseason tournament game toward the
NCAA’s cap on total allowable season games per team; under current rules, an entire preseason
tournament counts as only one game. Roberts, supra note 44. Though the measures obviously
threaten the preseason NIT’s viability by forcing teams to either forgo the tournament or play fewer
games during the regular season, the NCAA claims that the change is necessary “to get a handle on
the number of games that certain institutions play” and to achieve “a little more parity” in the number
of games that each team plays. Id.
79

80

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565, 568.

81

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).

82

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565.

83 The word “relatively” is used here because by the time the MIBA and NCAA filed these motions
on November 18, 2003, and April 8, 2004, respectively, much time had passed and money had been
spent since the initial filing of the suit in early January 2001. See Notice of Motion by Metropolitan
for an Order Granting Summary Judgment, Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 563
(No. 31); Reply Brief of NCAA in Support of Summary Judgment on the Merits, Metro. Intercollegiate
Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 563 (No. 64) (previously filed under seal); Reply Brief in Support
of Summary Judgment on Statute of Limitations, Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d
at 563 (No. 65) (previously filed under seal); see also supra text accompanying note 64. In fact, the
NCAA had already spent $5.7 million in 2001-2003 on legal services provided by Miller Canfield, the
firm representing the NCAA in its suit against the MIBA. Mark Alesia, NCAA-NIT trial near
settlement; Judge suspends case, sends jurors home as both sides negotiate, THE INDIANAPOLIS STAR, Aug. 17,
2005, at 1D [hereinafter Alesia II]. Presumably, however, a successful motion for summary judgment
could save further expenditures at trial and at any possible appeal.
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and § 2 of the Sherman Act84 only with respect to the NCAA’s Commitment to
Participate Rule.85 Its motion was denied.86
The NCAA sought summary judgment on all five of the contested
Postseason Rules,87 arguing that (1) the rules are “noncommercial” and therefore the
Sherman Act does not apply;88 (2) the rules are of the kind endorsed as “reasonable”
by the Supreme Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents;89 (3) under Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., the NCAA is a single entity and should be exempt from
analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act;90 and (4) the MIBA cannot show that the
NCAA rules have injured competition itself.91 The NCAA’s motion for summary
84

15 U.S.C. §§ 1 & 2 (2006).

85

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 568.

86 Id. at 573. Judge Cedarbaum of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New
York denied the MIBA’s motion for summary judgment under § 1 of the Sherman Act on the
grounds that “quick look” analysis was inappropriate in the case since it is appropriate solely in
instances where “an observer with even a rudimentary understanding of economics could conclude
that the arrangements in question would have an anticompetitive effect on customers and markets.”
Id. at 572 (quoting Cal. Dental Ass’n v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999)). The court’s
decision was based on the Southern District of Ohio’s decision in Worldwide Basketball & Sports Tours,
Inc. v. NCAA, No. 2:00-CV-1439, 2002 WL 32137511, at *6 (S.D. Ohio July 19, 2002) (refusing to
review the NCAA’s “Two in Four” restriction under a “quick look” analysis because plaintiff
promoters’ allegation that output suffered was negated by the presence of 319 available Division I
teams and only 25 certified events), rev’d on other grounds, 388 F.3d. 955 (6th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126
S. Ct. 334 (2005). Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 572-73. Adopting the
Worldwide court’s reasoning, the court observed that anticompetitive effects are not clearly present
where the MIBA may invite any of the 260 teams not invited to the NCAA playoff tournament and
where the MIBA failed to demonstrate that it had been unable to fill its brackets each year. Id. at 573.
The MIBA’s motion for summary judgment pursuant to § 2 of the Sherman Act also was denied; the
court concluded that a material question of fact existed as to whether the NCAA acted with a specific
intent to monopolize when it adopted the Commitment to Participate Rule. Id.

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); see
supra note 67 and accompanying text.
87

88

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 547.

89 Id. at 548 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. 85, 101 (1984)). The ruling in NCAA v. Board
of Regents will be examined further in Section II of this Article.
90 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549 (citing Copperweld Corp. v.
Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771 (1984)); Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp.
2d at 569-70.
91

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
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judgment was also denied, approximately one month after the court denied the
MIBA’s motion.92
5. Trial Coverage – “Trash Talking”
The case finally went to trial in the U.S. District Court in Manhattan on
August 1, 2005,93 more than four and a half years after the lawsuit was originally
filed.94 At trial, Jeffrey Kessler, the MIBA’s attorney, accused the NCAA of
eliminating the NIT’s ability to secure the best teams’ participation in the NIT
tournament; he compared competing with the NCAA for teams in the postseason
tournament to playing a “rigged game.”95 Kessler asked the presidents of the MIBA
schools to stand, introduced them to the jury, and explained that the NIT had once
been a tournament of prestige.96 He also told the jury that the NCAA’s March
Madness was attempting to ruin the postseason NIT, averring that the NCAA has
been corrupted by “the multi-billion-dollar business of college basketball.”97
The NCAA’s attorney, Gregory Curtner, pointed out that the MIBA schools
themselves are members of the NCAA.98 Nodding to the MIBA school officials,
including two members of the clergy, he told the jury “that those five schools ‘want
more money.’ ‘They want to take it from the other[s] . . . and put more of it in their
92 See id. The court found the NCAA’s arguments unpersuasive. It determined that the rules were
commercial, were not obviously reasonable under a Board of Regents analysis, and represented a
horizontal agreement among member schools; thus, the rules were subject to § 1 scrutiny. Id. at 54849. The court found triable issues of fact under a § 1 Rule of Reason analysis surrounding the
definition of a relevant market, harm to competition, pro-competitive justifications, and the existence
of less restrictive alternatives. Id. at 549-52. The court also denied the NCAA’s motion for summary
judgment on the § 2 claim, noting a genuine issue of fact regarding the NCAA’s possession of
“monopoly power” and maintenance of that power by the use of exclusionary means. Id. at 552. The
NCAA’s motion for summary judgment based on the statute of limitations was denied at oral
argument. Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.1.
93

Alesia, supra note 3.

94

See supra text accompanying note 67.

95

NIT sues NCAA, supra note 5.

96

Id.

97

Id.

98

Id.
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pocket’ . . . .”99 “[T]he NCAA has helped keep [the NIT] in business,” he said.100 He
proceeded to compare the NCAA to Congress as “a truly democratic institution”
and to note that the NCAA money distributed to member schools often goes to
support teams for women and unprofitable sports.101
Over the course of the ten day trial, the MIBA called coaches John Calipari
(University of Memphis) and Bobby Knight (Texas Tech University, formerly
Indiana University) to testify.102 Mr. Knight gave colorful testimony, calling the
NCAA a monopoly and stating, “I have felt as long as I’ve been in coaching . . . that
the NCAA has wanted to eliminate the NIT.”103 On August 16, 2005, the court
suspended the case as the parties neared a settlement.104 The NIT had been expected
to conclude its case that day with the testimony of a financial expert, and the NCAA
to open its case with testimony from NCAA President Myles Brand.105
C. Playing Until the Buzzer: The Settlement
1. Terms
The parties arrived at a settlement on Wednesday, August 17, 2005, ending
the historic struggle with the NCAA’s outright purchase of the NIT.106 Strikingly
different from a failed earlier proposal,107 the price included $40.5 million for the
99

Id.

100

Id.

101

Id.

102

Alesia II, supra note 83.

103

Id. (alteration in original).

104

Id.

Id. Also on the witness list for the NCAA were Jim Delany (Big Ten commissioner) and several
renowned coaches: Mike Kryzewski (Duke), Tubby Smith (Kentucky), and Jim Boeheim (Syracuse).
Id.

105

Andy Katz, NCAA buys tournaments, ends NIT litigation, ESPN.COM, Aug. 17, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/ncb/news/story?id=2136724 (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Katz].
106

The first proposal, tendered by the MIBA in April 2004, was for $75 million in damages and
included a provision for a lottery system to split teams for approximately three years; the NCAA
reportedly commented, “You can’t be serious.” Alesia II, supra note 83.
107
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transfer of ownership of both preseason and postseason NIT tournaments to the
NCAA, as well as $16 million to end the litigation, with the total amount payable in
installments over a ten-year period.108
2. Remarkable Amiability and New-Found Synergy
The aftermath of the settlement signaled a suspiciously remarkable
turnaround in the conduct and goals of each party. The NCAA moved from the
staunch and caustic defense of its rule demanding participation in its own event109 to
welcoming the NIT and broadcasting an intent “to grow [the two NIT] tournaments
to showcase college basketball and the student-athletes who make the game great.”110
The annual $1.85–$3 million payments through 2010 under ESPN’s contract with
the NIT,111 combined with the opportunity to control or even eliminate its former
competitor, suggest other motives.
The MIBA had a change in ideals as well, as it moved from relying heavily on
the grand history and roots of its tournament to convince the court of the
anticompetitive effects of the NCAA’s actions,112 to later accepting a lucrative deal
that leaves the fate of the NIT in the hands of an organization that owns its own
postseason tournament.
The settlement, though a resolution of the dispute between the two
Associations, begs the question: what will happen to the NIT? Part IV(b) of this
Article addresses that query. First, however, Part II more closely examines the
legality of the Postseason Rules and Part III, the legality of the acquisition itself.

108

Press Release, supra note 2.

109

See supra text accompanying notes 98-100.

110

Press Release, supra note 2.

111

Alesia II, supra note 83.

112

See supra text accompanying notes 44-50, 96.
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II. VALIDITY OF THE MIBA’S CLAIMS – HAD THE NCAA STEPPED OUT OF
BOUNDS?
A. Sherman Act § 1
Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act provides: “Every contract,
combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is hereby declared to be
illegal. . . .”113 Since any and all agreements technically impose some level of restraint
on trade, the act has been interpreted to declare illegal only those restraints that “may
suppress or even destroy competition” as opposed to those that “merely regulate[]
and perhaps thereby promote[] competition.”114 A plaintiff may prove that the
restriction violates § 1 by establishing that (1) there was an agreement, conspiracy, or
combination between two or more entities; (2) the agreement was an unreasonable
restraint of trade under a per se or Rule of Reason analysis; and (3) the restraint
affected interstate commerce.115
1. NCAA as Promulgator: Single Entity Rules or Horizontal Agreements?
Generally, a single entity is not capable of forming a “contract, combination .
. . or conspiracy” and thereby is not subject to § 1.116 However, rules adopted and
executed by the NCAA are conceptually viewed as “the agreement and concert of
action of the various members of the association, as well as that of the association
itself,” thereby rendering any rules promulgated by the NCAA properly subject to
15 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). The act deems violation a felony punishable by fines up to $100 million for a
corporation and $1 million for any other person, as well as imprisonment for up to 10 years. Id.
113

Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238 (1918). To conduct the analysis, a
court must generally consider

114

facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and after
the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or probable. The
history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the particular
remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts.
Id.
115

Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.1998).

See Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769-71 (holding that a parent company
and its wholly owned subsidiary are properly viewed as a single entity because of their “complete unity
of interest,” and therefore agreements between them fall outside the purview of § 1).
116
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scrutiny under § 1.117 In fact, every year each member school must agree in
writing to abide by all of the NCAA rules, including those regarding the NCAA
tournament.118 If the member schools’ economic interests were completely unified,
such formalism would not be necessary.
2. Interstate Commerce Implicated?
Courts have categorized the NCAA’s rules into two types:119 those
considered “commercial”120 and those considered primarily “non-commercial.”121 In
Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader,122 the Supreme Court acknowledged that the Sherman Act
is primarily aimed at combinations possessing commercial objectives and applies
only to a limited extent to organizations with non-commercial objectives.123
117 Hennessey v. NCAA, 564 F.2d 1136, 1147 (5th Cir. 1977). The court also observed that “the
‘voluntary’ nature of the NCAA” does not bar members from bringing suit against it for damages,
since the NCAA levies significant sanctions for violation of its rules and thus pressure for compliance
exists. Id.

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 569 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The
NCAA asserted that, because its members have “a unified interest in the success of the NCAA
Tournament,” they act as a single entity with respect to tournament decisions. Id. The court refused
to give credence to that argument, pointing out that members “exist as independent institutions of
higher education” and “[t]he fact that these individual members participate in the NCAA Tournament
does not turn the membership into a single actor.” Id. at 570.
118

119 See, e.g., Justice v. NCAA, 577 F. Supp. 356, 383 (D. Ariz. 1983) (noting the distinction between
rules rooted in the NCAA’s concern for amateurism and those “accompanied by a discernible
economic purpose”).
120 See, e.g., Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150-51 (restrictions on the number of assistant coaches affected the
multi-state collegiate coach employment market and thus implicated interstate commerce).
121 See, e.g., Jones v. NCAA, 392 F. Supp. 295, 303 (D. Mass. 1975) (stating that no nexus was present
between NCAA eligibility guidelines and the Association’s commercial or business activities, and
therefore the rules were held to be outside the ambit of the Sherman Act).
122

310 U.S. 469 (1940).

Id. at 491-93; see also Klor’s, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 n.7 (1959);
Stephanie M. Greene, Regulating the NCAA: Making the Calls under the Sherman Antitrust Act and Title IX,
52 ME. L. REV. 81, 83-88 (2000) (discussing how several recent cases illustrate the boundaries of
NCAA regulatory freedom within the bounds of the Sherman Act and concluding that rules focusing
on student-athlete eligibility are either outside the scope of the Act due to their non-commercial
nature or they survive a Rule of Reason analysis because they are either not anticompetitive or have
more substantial procompetitive aspects that enhance competition overall) [hereinafter Greene].
123
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Although the NCAA has repeatedly insisted that its rules are non-commercial
and do not restrain interstate commerce,124 the requisite subject matter jurisdiction is
established because the NCAA’s “overall business activity—not merely the particular
conduct in question—has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”125 Moreover,
the rules at issue in this case are in place for the admitted purpose of ensuring that
the best teams will participate in the NCAA tournament, making it more attractive to
fans, advertisers, and television broadcasters, which clearly intimates the rules’
commercial nature.126
3. Unreasonable Restraint of Trade? Standard of Analysis
Much of the confusion typically surrounding § 1 analysis involves the
applicable standard: whether the court should apply a per se standard,127 a full Rule of
See, e.g, Hennessey, 564 F.2d at 1150; Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp.
2d 545, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 383.
124

Justice, 577 F. Supp. at 378 (citing McLain v. Real Estate Bd., 444 U.S. 232, 242-43 (1980)). In
reaching its conclusion that the requisite interstate activity was established, the Justice court
commented on the national scope of recruiting efforts, team transportation across state lines for
participation in NCAA events, and the NCAA’s involvement in interstate television broadcasting of
its events. Id.
125

126

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 548.

Early in antitrust jurisprudence, restraints subject to § 1 were subdivided into two categories: those
that had no purpose other than the restraint of trade and those that, though restraining trade, were
“ancillary” to an otherwise legitimate purpose. See United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 85 F.
271, 282 (6th Cir. 1898), aff’d, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). An irrebuttable presumption of unreasonableness
attaches to restraints representing the former group; such restraints are deemed per se unlawful under
the Sherman Act. United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 607 (1972). If a court
determines that the restraint lacks any legitimate purpose and exists solely to restrain trade, no further
analysis is required and the agreement is proscribed. Id.; see United States v. Trenton Potteries Co.,
273 U.S. 392 (1927) (declaring an agreement among sellers of bathroom fixtures to fix prices
categorically unreasonable and unlawful under the Sherman Act). Other types of agreements that
have fallen into the per se category include “naked” horizontal territorial limitations and concerted
refusals to deal. See, e.g., Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. at 610; Klor’s Inc., 359 U.S. at 210-12. The Court
in Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc. declared a per se rule applicable when the
agreement “facially appears to be one that would always or almost always tend to restrict competition
and decrease output . . . .” Broad. Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 19-20 (1979).
These types of restraints, when not ancillary to a legitimate lawful purpose, are ordinarily condemned
as a matter of law because of the extremely high probability that they are unreasonably
anticompetitive. NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 100 (1984). The Court has
noted that the justification for applying a per se rule is partly “rooted in administrative convenience.”
FTC v. Super. Ct. Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411, 434 (1990).

127
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Reason analysis,128 or a truncated Rule of Reason analysis, commonly referred to
as a “quick look” analysis.129 However, the Court in NCAA v. Board of Regents made
clear that, because the industry of college athletics is one in which certain horizontal
restraints on competition are necessary for the product to be available at all, cases
involving the NCAA are appropriately analyzed under the Rule of Reason.130 The
“product” is collegiate competition itself: those athletic contests between competing
The Rule of Reason is the most common analysis performed in antitrust, presumably because most
restrictive agreements have at least some measure of pro-competitiveness. The basic structure of the
analysis was first stated in Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States. Bd. of Trade of Chicago v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231, 237-38 (1918); see supra note 114 and accompanying text. Essentially, the
test of reasonableness involves a balancing of all the circumstances of a case to determine whether or
not the challenged restraint unreasonably restricts competition. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019
(10th Cir.1998). The plaintiff bears the initial burden of proving that the agreement causes
anticompetitive effects in the relevant market by either showing actual anticompetitive effects or by
proving the defendant has market power. Id. Once the plaintiff makes that showing, the burden
shifts and the defendant must show that the restraint promotes a pro-competitive objective. Id. If the
defendant makes such a showing, the burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff to demonstrate that
the restraint is not reasonably necessary to achieve the stated objective. Id. If the defendant cannot
offer a legitimate justification, the restraint is condemned. Id. The Rule of Reason is the standard by
which this Article’s analysis is conducted. See Section II(a)(iv), infra.
128

In Board of Regents, the Court introduced the “quick look” Rule of Reason analysis, which is
applicable in cases where, though immediate per se condemnation of an agreement is not appropriate,
no elaborate industry analysis is needed in order to discern the anticompetitive character of a restraint
that is inherently suspect. Law, 134 F.3d at 1020 (citing Gary R. Roberts, The NCAA, Antitrust, and
Consumer Welfare, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2631, 2636-39 (1996) [hereinafter Roberts]). For example, under
this standard, if anticompetitive effects are apparent, market power need not be proven, and the court
goes straight to an examination of the defendant’s pro-competitive justifications for the restriction.
See, e.g., Law, 134 F.3d at 1020.
129

The confusion surrounding which of the three methods to utilize is apparent. See Bd. of Regents, 468
U.S. at 104 n.26 (indicating that no “bright line” exists to separate a per se analysis from one under the
Rule of Reason). The court went on to explain,
Per se rules may require considerable inquiry into market conditions before the
evidence justifies a presumption of anticompetitive conduct. For example, while
the Court has spoken of a “per se” rule against tying arrangements, it has also
recognized that tying may have procompetitive justifications that make it
inappropriate to condemn without considerable market analysis.
Id.
130Bd.

of Regents, 468 U.S. at 100-01. The court in the case at issue also found the “quick look” Rule of
Reason approach inappropriate. See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp.
2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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colleges and universities.131 Such “necessary” rules are many and include, for
example, the size of the court or field and the number of players allowed on a
team,132 as well as rules required to preserve the character of the product, such as
requiring athletes to attend classes and to not be paid.133 As a result, even in cases
where member schools’ ability to compete in terms of price and output is overtly
restrained, a “fair evaluation” of the effects on competition necessitates an
examination of the NCAA’s pro-competitive justifications for its rules under the
Rule of Reason analysis.134
4. Rule of Reason Analysis
Regardless of which method of analysis is employed, the inquiry remains the
same: Does the challenged restraint enhance or suppress competition?135 Under a
Rule of Reason analysis, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of establishing that the
restraint produces significant anticompetitive effects within the relevant market.136
Once the anticompetitive effects have been established, the burden of production
shifts to the defendant to provide evidence that the restraint at issue has procompetitive effects that outweigh the anticompetitive effects.137 Finally, if the

131

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 101.

Id. The Court went on to observe the absurdity of those contests should they be conducted with
no agreed rules. Id.
132

Id. at 102. The court noted that “the integrity of the ‘product’ cannot be preserved except by
mutual agreement; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a
competitor on the playing field might soon be destroyed.” Id. The truth of the Court’s observation in
this regard is essentially that which provokes economists to write volumes criticizing the NCAA’s
function as a cartel enforcer, enabling members to “agree” to keep their own input costs (such as that
of player compensation in the form of financial aid) down and to control member action by sanction.
See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
133

134

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 103.

135

Id. at 104.

136

Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (2004).

Id. Significant criticism exists concerning the weight assigned pro- and anticompetitive effects in
order to arrive at the net result. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 129, at 2655-56 (observing that the effects
are neither “qualitatively similar nor quantitatively measurable” and concluding that in cases where
one effect is not clearly dominant over the other there is little a fact-finder can do outside of
intuitively sensing how “bad” or how “good” the effects are, given the lack of judicial guidance).
137
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defendant meets that burden, the plaintiff must prove that those legitimate procompetitive objectives are achievable through substantially less restrictive means.138
a. Anti-Competitive Effects in the Relevant Market?
An assessment of anti-competitive effects first requires a determination of
the “relevant market.”139 Courts have defined “relevant market” as those
commodities “reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes;”140 it
encompasses both product and geographic markets.141 The MIBA argued in its
motion for summary judgment that the relevant market is properly viewed as
Division I men’s college basketball.142 The NCAA, on the other hand, posited that its
tournament belongs to a market of “marquee sports programming” along with
premiere professional sporting events, including the Super Bowl, the World Series,
and the Olympic Games, and not to a market that includes the NIT because the two
tournaments are neither “similar” nor “interchangeable.”143
A genuine issue of fact existed as to the definition, and thus it properly was
not decided in the motion for summary judgment; however it is likely that the court
at trial would have determined that the relevant market would be Division I men’s
college basketball, as demonstrated by the MIBA. The Supreme Court in NCAA v.
Board of Regents went to great lengths to emphasize that televised college football
games have “an audience uniquely attractive to advertisers,” and, therefore,
“competitors are unable to offer programming that can attract a similar audience.”144
As a result, the Court found that professional games were not reasonably
138

Worldwide Basketball, 388 F.3d at 959.

139

See id. at 959.

140

Id. at 961 (quoting United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)).

141

Id. at 959.

142 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). The
MIBA also asserted that several submarkets exist in regard to the tournaments at issue, including “the
business of operating Division I men’s college basketball tournaments and the business of operating
postseason tournaments in particular.” Id. Recall that the MIBA also owns the rights to and operates a
preseason National Invitational Tournament. See supra note 79.
143

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549.

144

NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984).
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interchangeable.145 It would hardly require an exercise of the imagination to extend
the same reasoning to the business of NCAA men’s Division I basketball. In fact,
the two tournaments were indeed found to be “reasonably interchangeable” by the
District Judge to the extent that both (and only those two tournaments) feature (1)
competition between Division I men’s college basketball teams after the regular
season has concluded; (2) games that are played all around the country; and (3)
games that are nationally televised.146
Assuming that the relevant market is Division I men’s basketball, the MIBA
would then have had to prove that the restraint had anticompetitive effects in that
market.147 The burden of proof requires a showing of harm to competition itself (e.g.,
through price increases or decreases in output or quality), and not merely harm to
the MIBA,148 because, in the enactment of antitrust law, Congress clearly expressed
“concern with the protection of competition, not competitors.”149 This requirement
becomes something of a conundrum in the instant case because, as the District Judge
aptly noted, (1) the NIT is the only postseason tournament besides that of the
NCAA; and (2) each of the two tournament organizers markets competition itself.150

145

See id.

146 Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 549-50. The NCAA tournament is currently
broadcast on CBS, while the NIT is televised by ESPN. See supra notes 35, 107 and accompanying
text. Nonetheless, could the NCAA have successfully argued that, though not in a relevant market
that includes professional sporting events, their “marquee” status has eliminated the NIT from the
market definition, and thus the NCAA men’s basketball tournament is truly “in a league of its own”
and does not compete with the NIT? The author of this Article would conclude in the negative.
First, the purpose of antitrust law would hardly be served by allowing defendants whose restraints
have illegally pushed their competitors out of the defined relevant markets an effective safe-harbor
created by their illicit action. Second, if the NCAA did not in fact compete with the NIT, the NCAA
would not have had the incentive to transform its One Postseason Tournament Rule, which merely
“suggested” that member schools choose the NCAA tournament over the NIT, into a rule requiring
its members to make that choice. See supra notes 69-75 and accompanying text.
147

Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (2004).

148

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 550.

149

Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962).

150

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551.
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Even given these difficulties, however, harm to quality and output is
provable to the extent that, without these three Postseason Rules,151 lower seeded
teams in the NCAA tournament might choose to participate instead in the NIT,
where their chances for advancement would be greater; in addition, many teams
might opt to play in both tournaments. Thus, the rules operate to deprive
consumers of another potentially attractive tournament choice.152
The
“anticompetitive nature” of the NCAA rules requiring invitees to participate in its
postseason tournament or none at all, coupled with the proven market power of the
NCAA in its successful acquisition of the “vast majority” of the most highly ranked
teams, creates a powerful argument for the establishment of anticompetitive
effects.153 Hence, had the case reached final judicial resolution, a finding of
anticompetitive effects would have been highly likely.
b. Pro-Competitive Effects?
Assuming a finding of anticompetitive effects, the NCAA’s burden of
production at that juncture would require evidence of pro-competitive effects of its
restraints in excess of their anticompetitive effects.154 The NCAA asserted two procompetitive justifications for its rules in its motion for summary judgment: (1)
(presumably highly ranked) member schools’ participation in its event is necessary to
ensure the “legitimacy of the National Champion,” and (2) without the imposition of
these rules, the NIT could “free-ride” on the NCAA’s product by “swooping in at
the last minute” and inducing teams to participate in the NIT.155 The NCAA’s
proffered justifications are properly examined on two levels: whether it is factually true

151 The Postseason Rules include the Commitment to Participate Rule, the End of Playing Season
Rule, and the One Postseason Rule. See supra note 67.
152

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 551.

153

Id.

Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (2004); see also text
accompanying note 137.

154

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552. The NCAA’s second justification was
phrased in terms of free-riding by “an[y] independent tournament.” However, their remarks have
been represented in the text in this manner, since it has been established that the NIT is the only
other postseason tournament for Division I men’s basketball teams. See supra text accompanying note
150.
155
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that the restraint in question provides the pro-competitive effects asserted and
whether the pro-competitive effects are themselves legitimate.156
1. Factual?
Though facially these arguments seem reasonable, a thorough inquiry
requires a closer look. The factual tangle lurking beneath the NCAA’s procompetitive assertions arises because the NCAA has also made claims that every
team’s goal and preference is to play in the NCAA tournament and has emphasized
that (1) since 1970 no team has passed on the NCAA’s tournament to play in the
NIT; and (2) not one team has asked for a waiver of the Commitment to Participate
Rule since its adoption.157 Thus, it seems the NCAA has undermined its own
justification for the rule if, without it, teams would still choose the NCAA
tournament.158
2. Legitimate?
The question of legitimacy is apparent in both asserted justifications. At first
glance, the protection of the “legitimacy of the National Champion” seems a sound
benefit to competition in that it would maintain the quality159 of the athletic product
(that is, the competition itself) and might prevent the public’s interest in that athletic
product from declining. An argument could be made, however, that the NCAA does
not hold the right to protect the authenticity of college basketball’s “Number One,”
especially in light of the fact that the NIT was the original “national championship.”160
The second pro-competitive benefit proffered by the NCAA is that of
preventing the NIT from “free-riding” on the NCAA’s product by enticing the best

Roberts, supra note 129, at 2658 (citing NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85,
101-02, 120 (1984)).

156

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552. The court criticized the NCAA’s
justifications and stated that there was “at least a question of fact” as to whether the rule had real procompetitive effects. Id.
157

158

Id.

159 Increases in output and quality and decreases in price are among those considered pro-competitive
effects. Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1023 (10th Cir.1998).
160

See supra text accompanying notes 46-50.
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teams to participate instead in the NIT.161 This argument seems to stem from
the same sense of entitlement as the first “pro-competitive benefit” asserted by the
NCAA, which, as discussed above, is questionable at best. Combined with the
factual objections previously entertained, the NCAA’s position appears to rest on the
premise that competition is itself harmful; the judiciary has universally denied this
argument in light of Congressional determination to promote competition.162
Since the NCAA would have the burden of showing net pro-competitive
benefits and that the restraints are related or tailored to the interests they purport to
protect,163 it seems unlikely that it would prevail.
c. Least Restrictive Alternative?
Should the NCAA manage to convince the court of the Postseason Rules’
pro-competitive benefits, the MIBA would still have an opportunity to prevail on its
claim if it could prove the existence of less restrictive alternatives to the current
rules.164 One such alternative was noted by the District Judge in the denial of the
NCAA’s motion for summary judgment: allowing teams to participate in both events
by scheduling them so they do not overlap, and abolishing the One Postseason
Tournament Rule.165 Elimination of the Commitment to Participate Rule might
mean that some ranked teams would play in the NIT rather than the NCAA
tournament, but any concerns about legitimizing a single national champion could be
alleviated by implementing a point system akin to college football rankings in the

161

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552.

See, e.g., Nat’l Soc’y of Prof’l Eng’rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 684, 695-96 (1978) (rejecting
defendant’s argument that “competition among professional engineers was contrary to the public
interest” and explaining that “[t]he Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately
competition will produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services,” and “the Rule of
Reason does not support a defense based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable”);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220 (1940) (ruling that “the elimination of socalled competitive evils is no legal justification” for price-fixing and that to rule otherwise would
undermine the whole philosophy of the Sherman Act, namely to promote competition).

162

163

See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 118-19 (1984).

See Worldwide Basketball & Sport Tours, Inc. v. NCAA, 388 F.3d 955, 959 (2004); see also text
accompanying supra note 136.
164

165

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 339 F. Supp. 2d at 552.
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Bowl Championship Series (“BCS”) standings or, as suggested by Bobby Knight, by
having the winners of each tournament play off against the other.166
B. Sherman Act § 2
1. Conspiracy to Monopolize
The MIBA also claimed that the NCAA violated § 2 of the Sherman Act,
which states: “Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or
combine or conspire . . . to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony . . . .”167 Specifically, the
MIBA asserted that the NCAA’s Commitment to Participate Rule violated § 2
because it constituted a conspiracy to monopolize.168 A prima facie showing for such
a claim includes the following elements: (1) concerted action; (2) specific intent to
achieve an unlawful monopoly; and (3) commission of an overt act in furtherance of
the conspiracy.169

166

See Alesia II, supra note 83.

167

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).

168

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v. NCAA, 337 F. Supp. 2d 563, 573 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).

169 Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 74 (2d Cir. 1988) (citing
United States v. Consol. Laundries Corp., 291 F.2d 563, 573 (2d Cir. 1961)); Int’l Distribution Ctrs.,
Inc. v. Walsh Trucking Co., 812 F.2d 786, 795 (2d Cir. 1987). Courts tend to confuse the elements of
conspiracy to monopolize with the elements of attempt to monopolize; the latter requires a showing
of dangerous probability of success, while the former does not. Int’l Distribution Ctrs., Inc., 812 F.2d at
795 n.8 (citing Levitch v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 649, 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Am.
Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 789 (1946)). The intent to achieve a lawful monopoly,
such as through “superior skill, foresight and industry,” is not proscribed; this is assumed to be a
legitimate goal of every big business. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d
Cir. 1945) (acknowledging that a single producer may be the sole survivor of a group of active
competitors through such business prowess and stating, “[t]he successful competitor, having been
urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins”).
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a. Concerted Action & Overt Act in Furtherance of the Conspiracy
With respect to the first element, because the NCAA’s rules have been found
to constitute agreements subject to analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act,170 it is
likely that the court would have acknowledged the existence of concerted action.171
Furthermore, an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy seems to be evident in the
promulgation of the Postseason Rules, to which all members must agree in writing
each year172 and from which no team has requested a waiver.173
b. Specific Intent to Achieve Unlawful Monopoly
Though conceptually simple, the application of the “specific intent”
requirement has been a somewhat elusive concept for the courts.174 In order to
evince such intent on the part of the NCAA, the MIBA produced statements made
by various members of NCAA committees during the 1940s to 1960s that the MIBA
argued were proof of illegal motivation behind the Commitment to Participate Rule’s
adoption.175 The NCAA maintained that the proffered statements were “unrelated”
and did not illuminate the reasons for the rule’s adoption.176 The court determined
that this issue was a material question of fact to be resolved at trial.177
170

See supra notes 116-18 and accompanying text.

171 Despite the readily apparent logical connection, the district judge, in ruling that summary judgment
for the MIBA was inappropriate, did not address the issue. See Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337
F. Supp. 2d at 563.
172

See supra text accompanying note 118.

173

See supra text accompanying note 157.

See Daniel E. Feld, Annotation, What Constitutes “Attempt to Monopolize,” Within Meaning of § 2 of
Sherman Act (15 U.S.C. § 2), 27 A.L.R. FED. 762, § 2(a) (2005) (noting that the definition and
treatment of the element of specific intent vary considerably across lower courts and that no clear
majority approach exists from the opinions; some opinions contain no analysis whatsoever behind
their conclusions while some recite facts pertaining to the conduct at issue followed by a finding that
specific intent can or cannot be inferred from that conduct, with little or no analysis offered in
support) [hereinafter Feld].
174

175

Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n, 337 F. Supp. 2d at 573.

176

Id.

177

Id.
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The history surrounding the establishment of the rule, which ended the
practice of NCAA member schools independently choosing to participate in the NIT
instead of the NCAA tournament,178 suggests that the NCAA acted to pursue a
monopoly in the market through means other than legitimate “superior skill,
foresight, and industry”: its cartel-like control over individual members.179 Given the
weight of this evidence, coupled with the fact that specific intent is often inferred
purely from the intuition of the fact-finder,180 the NCAA faced serious risk that
specific intent to achieve an unlawful monopoly would have been found to exist.
2. Monopolization
In order to succeed against the NCAA on a claim of § 2 monopolization,181
the MIBA would have had to prove “(1) the possession of monopoly power in the
relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product,
business acumen, or historic accident.”182
a. Monopoly Power in the Relevant Market
Assuming that the relevant market is Division I men’s basketball,183 the first
element of a § 2 monopolization claim requires a finding that the NCAA possessed
monopoly power in that market.184 The fact that every NCAA member school
178

See supra notes 52-62, 69-72 and accompanying text.

179

See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.

180

See Feld, supra note 174, at § 2(a).

The district judge made no specific mention of a monopolization or attempted monopolization in
either of the orders denying summary judgment; however, the judge did state that the MIBA had
raised a genuine issue of fact on “its claim that NCAA possesses monopoly power in the market . . .
and maintains this monopoly through exclusionary means.” Metro. Intercollegiate Basketball Ass’n v.
NCAA, 339 F. Supp. 2d 545, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). These two claims represent both elements of a
monopolization offense under § 2 of the Sherman Act; thus, the existence of such a complaint has
been inferred.
181

Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 596 n.19 (1985) (quoting United
States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966)).
182

183

See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.

184

Aspen Skiing Co., 472 U.S. at 596 n.19 (quoting Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. at 570-71).
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agrees in writing to abide by, and in reality does abide by, a Commitment to
Participate Rule and other relevant Postseason Rules supports the conclusion that
the NCAA possesses monopoly power.185 The fact that the NCAA promulgated the
rules in the first place shows that it acted like a monopolist; such behavior itself is
relevant to a finding of monopoly power because only a true monopolist can raise
prices, reduce output, or otherwise behave in a monopolistic fashion without
suffering a loss of profit to its competitors.186 Therefore, the extreme profitability
that the NCAA has sustained over periods of years suggests that it holds monopoly
power in Division I men’s basketball tournaments.187
b. Illegitimate Acquisition or Maintenance
The NCAA has certainly acquired its monopoly power in part because of its
stellar marketing efforts (who hasn’t heard of March Madness?). However, the
conduct proscribed by the second element of a monopolization claim includes the
construction of barriers to entry into the market by a firm possessing monopoly
power.188 The Commitment to Participate Rule itself, as well as the combination of
all of the NCAA’s Postseason Rules, could easily be characterized by the court as a
restraint constituting an unlawful barrier to entry into the relevant market, inhibiting
competition from the NIT and other potential tournament sponsors.
C. Summary: Much Risk for the NCAA
Though doubtlessly a trier of fact would find resolution of these issues a
demanding and arduous task, a strong likelihood exists that the MIBA would have
See, e.g., Volvo N. Am. Corp. v. Men’s Int’l Prof’l Tennis Council, 857 F.2d 55, 73 (2d Cir. 1988)
(tennis association alleged to have exhibited monopoly power in that the top one hundred men’s
professional tennis players signed the association’s “Commitment Agreement” which included certain
restrictive provisions).

185

See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 472 (1992) (refusing to
grant summary judgment to defendant company where, after adopting a restrictive sales policy to
drive out a competitor, its sales were not found to have declined as would reasonably be expected of a
company with less than monopoly power).

186

187

See, e.g., supra notes 35-38 and accompanying text.

See, e.g., United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 345-46 (D. Mass. 1953), aff’d
per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954) (declaring lease-only and full-service-only practices resulting in
construction of barriers to entry of rivals in primary manufacturing and derivative service markets
illegal despite the proffered justification that the conduct was necessary to ensure the quality of the
product and to achieve maximum economies of production and distribution).
188
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succeeded on one or more of its claims.189 Even so, in at least two respects, the
NCAA faced much greater risks in this litigation than merely the risk of being
compelled to make pecuniary restitution to the MIBA and to eliminate its
Commitment to Participate Rule. The first of these risks illustrates the beauty of
antitrust law for a plaintiff in such a suit: the magical phrase “treble damages,” which
allows a successful plaintiff whose property or business is injured due to violations of
antitrust law to recover triple damages from the violator, in addition to attorneys’
fees.190 A financial loss of that magnitude would be a stunning blow, even to an
organization as vast as the NCAA.
There is, however, a second aspect of an unfavorable judgment that would
be felt even more deeply by the NCAA: the prospect of ceding an untold amount of
control over its members. If one or all of its Postseason Rules were to be struck
down as violations of antitrust law under §§ 1 or 2 of the Sherman Act, or both, the
NCAA could likely expect many more challenges to its existing rules, especially those
affecting the commercial aspects of its operations.191 The virtual immunity from
antitrust law that it has historically enjoyed (outside of blatant price-fixing

This assessment is also reflected by sports antitrust analysts and practicing attorneys. For example,
Paul Haagen, a sports law expert at Duke University, commented after the parties settled that he was
not surprised, “especially given the ‘potential for serious risk’” being faced by the NCAA. Doug
Lederman, Ending Court Fight, NCAA Buys NIT, INSIDE HIGHER ED, Aug. 18, 2005,
www.insidehighered.com/news/2005/08/18/nit (last visited Oct. 2, 2006) [hereinafter Lederman].
Haagen noted that, while the Association faced a serious financial price tag if it did not win the
antitrust suit, there was even more risk in the “enormous disruption” it could’ve experienced: “To
lose this really could have been to endanger the entire viability of the organization.” Id. Prior to
settlement, sports law expert at Tulane, Gary Roberts, agreed, stating: “The potential here is
significant . . . [t]he NCAA is at some risk.” Alesia, supra note 3. Stressing the unpredictability of
antitrust cases, he said, “Anytime you take an antitrust case to a jury of people off the street, it’s a
crapshoot. . . . The issues are very complex and the laws themselves are sufficiently vague that it
could come out in a lot of different ways.” Id. Even the NCAA’s general counsel admitted, “The
ultimate (adverse) outcome, though remote, would be so devastating there’s no way not to take
something like this seriously.” Id.

189

190

15. U.S.C. § 15 (2006).

191 Those comprehensive restraints on “inputs” regarding eligibility requirements and the like would
still probably be found reasonable under a Board of Regents analysis. See supra notes 130-33 and
accompanying text; see also Greene, supra note 123, at 88 (concluding that NCAA rules focusing on
student-athlete eligibility to compete in college sports are either beyond the scope of the Sherman Act
as non-commercial in nature, or survive a Rule of Reason analysis because they are either not
anticompetitive or have more substantial pro-competitive aspects that enhance competition overall).
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activities192) would be shaken, and its ability to dictate the behavior and options
of its members would finally meet some palpable limitation.
Because the outcome of the litigation involved great risks for both parties,
given their respective investments in the tournaments, generally, and in the litigation,
specifically, it is no great surprise that they chose to settle their dispute. Ironically, by
virtue of their chosen settlement form, their antitrust woes may have just begun.
III. LEGALITY OF THE ACQUISITION – SHOULD THE DOJ BLOW THE WHISTLE?
“We’ve now unified postseason basketball,” said Myles Brand, President of
the NCAA.193 This is a telling remark to antitrust scholars because it suggests the
elimination of competition in that arena. A merger or acquisition (like the NCAA’s
acquisition of the NIT resulting from the settlement) is subject to multiple facets of
antitrust law. As an agreement between competitors, the transaction is subject to
scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act as a potentially unreasonable “restraint of
trade.”194 It can also be analyzed under § 2 of the Sherman Act as a
“monopolization” of or an “attempt to monopolize” a market.195 However, primary
enforcement of antitrust law as it relates to mergers and acquisitions is accomplished
through § 7 of the Clayton Act.196

192 See, e.g., NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 111 (1984) (fixing prices for
football television contracts); Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1016 (10th Cir.1998) (setting a salary cap
for entry level coaches).
193

Katz, supra note 106.

194 See section II (a), supra. Since the Postseason Rules and bracket expansions constituted valid claims
under § 1 and § 2 of the Sherman Act that required a trial, it seems very likely that a merger
eliminating all competition between the only two postseason Division I men’s basketball tournament
sponsors would also be found to be either an illegal restraint of trade under § 1, an illegal
monopolization of the market under § 2, or both.

See section II (b), supra. Also, the FTC may challenge mergers under § 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2006); see also Constance K. Robinson, Mergers and Acquisitions, 1484
PLI/CORP. 303, 310 (2005) [hereinafter Robinson].
195

Robinson, supra note 195, at 309; see 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). This is likely the case because § 7 of the
Clayton Act has a significantly broader reach than §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, since § 7 was
explicitly intended from its enactment “to reach incipient monopolies and trade restraints outside the
scope of the Sherman Act . . . .” Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.32 (1962)
(citing S. REP. NO. 698, at 1 (1914)). The “incipiency standard” enables the plaintiff to proceed
without having to prove actual anticompetitive effects. See id. (citing S. REP. NO. 1775, at 4-5 (1950),
as reprinted in 1950 U.S.S.C.A.N. 4296). Also, the broad language of the statute enables the
196
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A. Clayton Act § 7:
1. Judicial Interpretation
Section 7 of the Clayton Act was enacted in 1914 in an attempt to better
regulate merger activity.197 Today it contains the prohibition, “No person engaged in
. . . any activity affecting commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or
any part of the stock or other share capital . . . or any part of the assets of another
person engaged also in . . . any activity affecting commerce, where…the effect of
such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly.”198
Bolstered by amendments made to the Clayton Act in 1950,199 the Supreme
Court began to apply the Act’s proscriptions more strictly, using the expansive
language of those amendments to increase the power of the judiciary and the federal
agencies to restrict mergers and acquisitions.200 The Supreme Court interpreted the

government to challenge a transaction anytime, whether before or after its consummation. See
ANDREW I. GAVIL ET AL., ANTITRUST LAW IN PERSPECTIVE: CASES, CONCEPTS AND PROBLEMS IN
COMPETITION POLICY 419 (2002) [hereinafter GAVIL ET AL.]; see also Robinson, supra note 195, at 309
(noting that in United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 597 (1957), the government
brought suit 30 years after an acquisition was consummated).
Before the Clayton Act’s enactment in 1914, horizontal mergers were only challenged if the merger
would result in monopolistic effects under § 2 of the Sherman Act; such challenges were largely
ineffective with very little consistency in the Act’s enforcement in that area. Brian Golden, The
Evolution of Horizontal Mergers and the 1992 Merger Guidelines, 28 NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 171 (1993)
[hereinafter Golden].
197

15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006) (emphasis added). The Court interpreted the Congressional intent behind
the word “may” to indicate concern, not with “certainties,” but with “probabilities,” expanding the
original scope of antitrust review under the Sherman Act. Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 323. The Senate
Report delineated the requisite measure of the likelihood of anticompetitive effects to be that of
“reasonable probability”: more than the mere possibility, but less than the “certainty and actuality of
injury to competition.” Id. (quoting S. REP. NO. 81-1775, at 6 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N.
4298; 51 CONG. REC. 14464 (1914) (statements of Sen. Reed)).
198

199 When originally enacted, the statute applied only to acquisitions of the stock of one company by
another, but not the acquisition of a company through the purchase of all or most of its assets;
amendments to the act in 1950 included the closing of this “asset acquisition” loophole. See Golden,
supra note 197, at 173-74.
200 Id. at 174; see also United States v. Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 346 (1963)
(acknowledging the expansive nature of the amended Act). The Court cited the House Report on the
bill to amend the statute: “The bill retains language . . . which is broad enough to prevent evasion of
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legislative intent in expanding the scope of the act as an attempt to stem the
“rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy.”201
A formidable precedent that became known as the “rule of presumptive
illegality” resulted from a string of decisions from 1962 to 1973,202 whereby a prima
facie case under § 7 merely required statistics showing that the resulting merged firm
controls “an undue percentage share” of the relevant market, and a resulting
“significant increase” in concentration of market participants.203 This showing could
only be overcome by “evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to have .
. . anticompetitive effects.”204
The rule of “presumptive illegality” has been eroded somewhat over the
years due to the sharp criticism of opinions written in its wake.205 Though later cases
affirmed the use of the rule as controlling precedent, they also illustrated that a
defendant could effectively rebut the presumption206 by (i) attacking the relevance of
the central purpose. It covers not only purchase of assets or stock but also any other method of
acquisition . . . .” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 81-1191, at 8-9 (1950)).
201

Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 315.

202

See Golden, supra note 197, at 177.

203

Philadelphia Nat’l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.

204 Id. The Court found the first element of requisite post-merger market share to be satisfied by a
combination controlling 30% of the relevant market. Id. at 364. A significant increase in
concentration was found to include an increase of 33%. Id. at 365.
205 The Court, in United States v. Von’s Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), went even further than the
presumption described in Philadelphia National Bank, it introduced a per se rule condemning an
otherwise efficient merger, holding that a merger contributing to a reduction in the number of
competitors can be found illegal, regardless of economic concentration of the market, level of
competition therein, or any positive effects on the market therefrom. Golden, supra note 197, at 180.
Noting the economic aspects of the market that should have alleviated any concern over its
monopolization, Justice Stewart, in a sharp dissent, rendered an oft quoted criticism: “The sole
consistency that I can find is that in litigation under [§ 7], the Government always wins.” Von’s
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. at 301.

See GAVIL ET AL., supra note 196, at 425. To effectively rebut the presumption, a defendant “must
produce evidence that ‘shows that the market-share statistics [give] an inaccurate account of the
[merger’s] probable effects on competition’ in the relevant market.” FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d
708, 715 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (quoting United States v. Citizens & S. Nat’l Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 120 (1975))
(alterations in original).
206
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market statistics in a particular industry;207 (ii) demonstrating low or non-existent
barriers to entry or a high level of sophistication among consumers in the market;208
(iii) factually substantiating net efficiencies;209 and (iv) showing that the acquisition
was of a “failing firm.”210
2. Application to the NCAA’s Acquisition of the NIT
The NCAA might argue that its purchase of the NIT is outside the scope of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act because the transaction does not consist of a corporation
acquiring another corporation in the traditional sense. However, a court would likely
find otherwise, given the breadth of the amended Act211 and the stated purposes of
the relevant amendments.212

207 See, e.g., United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 503 (1974) (reasoning that in the coal
market, competition is focused on the procurement of new long-term supply contracts, not on the
disposition of coal already produced under previous sales contract, and a company’s power to
compete depends on its uncommitted coal reserves, of which the company had little, thus the
company “was a far less significant factor . . . than . . . statistics seemed to indicate”).

See, e.g., United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 908 F.2d 981, 984 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (noting that the
Supreme Court adopted a “totality-of-the-circumstances approach” to interpreting § 7, and that “a
variety of factors” can be used to rebut the prima facie case of market concentration, including the
misleading nature of statistics, the sophistication of market consumers, the absence of significant
entry barriers, as well as those factors established in the Department of Justice’s Merger Guidelines).
The Merger Guidelines’ factors are introduced in detail in section IV(b)(ii), infra.
208

See, e.g., H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d at 725 (denying the proffered efficiency creation defense based on
a lack of the requisite factual findings that would “render that defense sufficiently concrete to rebut
the government’s prima facie showing”).

209

See, e.g., Int’l Shoe v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302-03 (1930) (holding that the purchase of a failing
company’s stock by a competitor “does not substantially lessen competition or restrain commerce
within the intent of the Clayton Act”).

210

The statute explicitly states that its application extends to any “person” that is “engaged in . . . any
activity affecting commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2006). It is well-established that the NCAA is such a
person affecting commerce. See supra notes 42, 124-26 and accompanying text. The statute prohibits
not only the acquisition of any kind of “share capital” in another such “person” but also the
acquisition of assets where the effect is to lessen competition or create a monopoly. 15 U.S.C. § 18.
The NCAA’s purchase of the MIBA’s right to own and operate the NIT is likely to constitute the
acquisition of assets, properly subject to scrutiny under the Act.

211

212

See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
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Recall once more that the relevant market can properly be defined as
Division I men’s college basketball,213 with potential relevant submarkets including
the businesses of operating Division I men’s college basketball tournaments,
generally, and postseason tournaments, specifically.214 In an analysis incorporating
any of these delineations of the relevant market, statistics regarding market share and
concentration would most likely meet the prima facie requirements under the
presumptive rule.215
The NCAA might assert mitigating factors; for instance, it might argue that,
despite the Association’s acquisition of its only existing rival in postseason Division I
men’s college basketball, barriers to entry are not significant. This argument,
however, is not persuasive in light of its existing Postseason Rules, which make the
prospect of another postseason tournament garnering any of the top sixty-five teams
in the country obsolete, and consequently, make entry into the market far less
attractive.
The Association has also vaguely alluded to efficiencies that it will realize as a
result of the acquisition by “‘mov[ing] the [NIT] to a new level’ . . . with the . . .
‘assets of the NCAA behind it.’”216 These assertions, however, will not be given
credence without demonstrable proof of such efficiencies.217

213

See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.

214

See supra note 142.

See supra notes 202-05 and accompanying text. Under the first element, the NCAA, after acquiring
the NIT, could be shown to control well more than the 30% found to be an “undue percentage
share” of the relevant market in Philadelphia National Bank, as it (now) sponsors all the regular season
and postseason games, leaving only a few preseason tournaments run by independent sponsors.
Secondly, viewed in terms of number of post-season tournaments or number of participating teams,
the resulting increase in concentration of market participants could very likely pass the 33%
“significant” holding in Philadelphia National Bank, especially with respect to the submarket of
postseason tournaments; the NCAA’s share of that market increased to 100% from one that was
significantly lesser, since it no longer has to compete with the NIT, which itself was a multi-million
dollar enterprise. See supra text accompanying note 111.
215

216 Lederman, supra note 189. This quote was excerpted from a statement by John Sexton, president
of NYU (one of the MIBA’s five member schools) upon announcement of the acquisition. Id.

See supra note 209 and accompanying text. The nature of the asserted efficiency does not lend itself
to be measured in any tangible way, making production of the requisite demonstrable proof nearly
impossible.
217
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The NCAA might also claim that the transaction is lawful under § 7 because
the NIT was already incapable of attracting the best teams and hence is a failing firm
or at least not a significant competitor of the NCAA; therefore, its acquisition by the
Association is not likely to substantially alter the competitive landscape. This
argument, however, will be difficult to sustain given the substantial revenue the NIT
garners in exchange for its television rights.218
3. Disposition Under and Enforcement of § 7
In summary, the transaction would be highly suspect and could very likely be
held presumptively illegal based on market share statistics. The NCAA would be
hard-pressed to substantiate mitigating factors sufficient to overcome that
presumption, especially in light of the heavier burden faced by a defendant seeking
to rebut such a compelling prima facie case.219 Accordingly, it is very likely that a
court would find, with the requisite reasonable probability,220 that the acquisition
substantially lessens competition or tends to create a monopoly in violation of § 7 of
the Clayton Act.
Though the analysis appears to lead to a finding of illegality, the transaction’s
legitimacy may never reach judicial review under § 7. Both private plaintiffs and the
government may have standing under the Act,221 but private plaintiffs usually do not
play an important role in merger regulation enforcement.222 Therefore, the merger
enforcement agencies (the DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”)) are the

218

See supra text accompanying note 111.

Instead of requiring a defendant to rebut the presumption of illegality by the “clear” showing
originally required in Philadelphia National Bank, the Court has required a defendant attempting to
rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effect to demonstrate that the prima facie case does not
accurately predict the transaction’s likely effect on competition. United States v. Baker Hughes, Inc.,
908 F.2d 981, 990-91 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Accordingly, the court recognized a sliding scale of required
showing by the defendant: “The more compelling the prima facie case, the more evidence the
defendant must present to rebut it successfully.” Id. at 991.
219

220

See supra note 198.

221

Robinson, supra note 195, at 310.

Most likely this is the case because any private plaintiff that is able to demonstrate antitrust injury
entitling it to standing in an antitrust suit must have motivation to bring suit; in merger cases, where
two competing firms combine, a rival usually lacks that motivation to sue to undo the merger because
it prefers fewer existing competitors and less competition in the relevant market.

222
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primary plaintiffs in these cases.223 Hence, while the Supreme Court represents
the ultimate authority in determining the legality of transactions challenged under §
7, the merger policies of these agencies often represent the sole criteria under which
a business combination is evaluated.224
The observation that private plaintiffs rarely file a complaint in merger
situations is illustrated in the case at hand. Since this is an acquisition by one
postseason tournament sponsor of the only other such entity, no true rival remains
to seek rescission of the sale. Television broadcasters, like CBS, that may later
endure increased prices in order to televise the NCAA tournament (and thus would
have standing based on antitrust injury) also lack motivation to raise a challenge.
Should one of the major network broadcasters lift a finger against the NCAA, it
would not only incur substantial expenditures to bring the issue to trial, but it would
effectively forfeit any hope of ever entering into a lucrative contract with the
Association. As March Madness continues to gain popularity and is not likely to
disappear in the foreseeable future, this would be a costly mistake indeed.
Thus, should the legality of this acquisition be challenged, such a claim would
likely be brought by the DOJ or FTC under the agencies’ Horizontal Merger
Guidelines.
B. DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
1. Purpose
The DOJ first released the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (“Merger
Guidelines” or “Guidelines”) in 1968 in response to the confusion created by the
Supreme Court’s decisions in the early 1960s.225 The latest Guidelines, issued in 1992
and subsequently revised in 1997, represent a joint effort by the DOJ and FTC
(collectively referred to as the “Agency”) “to reduce the uncertainty associated with
enforcement of the antitrust laws in [the merger] area.”226 They have significantly
contributed to enhancing the predictability of merger enforcement, ensuring that
Golden, supra note 197, at 182 n.164 (citing Note, The Cellophane Fallacy and the Justice Department’s
Guidelines for Horizontal Mergers, 94 YALE L.J. 670, 671-72 (1985)).

223

224

Id. at 182.

225

Id. at 180; see also supra notes 202-04 and accompanying text.

226

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 0.
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private practitioners and federal law enforcement officials follow the same analytical
framework.227
2. Analytical Framework
The acquisition at issue is properly analyzed under the five steps laid out in
the Merger Guidelines. These analytical steps are aimed at identifying those
“competitively harmful mergers” that “create or enhance market power or . . .
facilitate its exercise,” as opposed to most “mergers that are either competitively
beneficial or neutral.”228 The five steps of the analysis are: (1) determining market
concentration; (2) examining “potential adverse competitive effects;” (3) assessing
whether entry would likely deter or counteract the anticompetitive effects; (4)
“assess[ing] any efficiency gains;” and (5) determining whether either of the firms
would likely fail, resulting in the exit of its assets from the market.229
a. Market Definition and Measuring Concentration
A merger that does not significantly increase concentration or result in a
concentrated market ordinarily is not analyzed further under the Guidelines.230 In
order to assess the concentration of the relevant market that market must first be
defined in terms of product type and geography.
1. Relevant Product and Geographic Markets
Under the Guidelines, the relevant product market is determined to be that
market in which a hypothetical profit-maximizing monopolist would impose a “small
but significant and nontransitory” price increase based on the probable reaction of
buyers to such a price increase and whether the sales of the product would drop
enough to make the price increase unprofitable.231 In so analyzing the cross-elasticity

227

Robinson, supra note 195, at 310.

228

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 0.1.

229

Id. at § 0.2.

230

Id. at § 1.0.

Id. at § 1.11. The “small but significant and non-transitory” price increase used by the Agency in
its analysis is usually 5%; typically prices used are the current prices in the industry, or future prices, if
reasonably predictable. Id.
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of demand,232 the relevant product market will be the most narrowly defined
group of products to satisfy the test.233
As the depth of analysis required to replicate this process is beyond the scope
of this Article, the relevant product market will be presumed to be that noted by the
court: Division I men’s college basketball.234 More specifically, the relevant market
can be defined as postseason tournaments within that category, given their
reasonable interchangeability as found by the court in the suit under §§ 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act.235 Likewise, though summarily addressed, the only conceivable
geographic market is national in scope due to the unique nature of the product.
2. Measuring Concentration: HHI
Measuring the concentration of the market involves several steps: the current
producers or sellers must be identified, their respective market-shares calculated, and
the market’s concentration determined under an index known as the HerfindahlHirschman Index (“HHI”) by summing the squares of all participants’ market
shares.236 Identifying the producers in this instance requires no intensive search: the
The “cross-elasticity of demand” is an economic term representing the extent to which a price
increase in a particular product would induce consumers of that product to switch to others.
Robinson, supra note 195, at 312. It is calculated as the percentage change in demand for one good
that occurs as a response to a percentage change in the price of another good. Wikipedia, Cross
Elasticity of Demand, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/cross_elasticity_of_demand (last visited Oct 26,
2006). Where the two goods are complements, the cross elasticity of demand will be negative; where
the goods are substitutes, the cross elasticity of demand will be positive. Id.
232

233

See id.

234

See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying text.

See supra note 146 and accompanying text. The numerical data on the NCAA’s revenues from
television broadcast rights for primarily the Division I Men’s Basketball Championships are consistent
with such a result under the Guidelines; under the contract, each annual payment in fact represents a
price increase over the prior year of nearly 8%. See NCAA Membership Report, supra note 34, at 57
n.12. The Guidelines normally utilize a monopolist’s ability to profitably sustain a 5% increase in
price. See supra note 221. Clearly, the NCAA’s ability to negotiate price increases of that magnitude in
the Division I men’s basketball postseason playoffs year after year lends some measure of credibility
to the existence of such a market’s ability to be monopolized.
235

The HHI reflects the distribution of the market shares of all firms in the market, giving
proportionately greater weight to the larger firms’ market shares, which is consistent with their relative
importance and impact in competitive interactions. GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 1.5. Courts have
accepted the HHI as the best method of measuring market concentration; thus its use by the Agency
under the Merger Guidelines cannot be taken lightly by potential defendants. Robinson, supra note
195, at 315 (noting the use of HHI by the court to determine market concentration in FTC v. Cardinal
236
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only two entities running postseason Division I men’s basketball tournaments were
the MIBA and the NCAA.237 Their respective shares in that precise market can be
loosely approximated using the dollar sales of television broadcasting and marketing
rights reasonably allocable to postseason tournaments over the period of years
covered by current contracts.238 Rough calculations yield market share calculations
for the MIBA of 0.3% to 0.5% and for the NCAA, 99.5% to 99.7%.239 By summing
the squares of those numbers, the HHI concentration level is found to be
approximately 9,900 to 9,940.240 Thus the market for postseason basketball
tournaments clearly falls into the “highly concentrated” segment of the Guidelines,
which consists of markets with HHI levels of 1,800 and above.241 In this segment,
increases of fifty or more HHI points due to a merger require further analysis.242
Since eliminating its only competitor in the market will leave the NCAA with 100%
of the market, post-merger HHI is 10,000, and the increase in HHI due to the
merger is estimated at sixty to one hundred points.243 Hence, the acquisition should
Health, Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 34, 53 (D.D.C. 1998) and FTC v. H.J. Heinz Co., 246 F.3d 708, 715-17
(D.C. Cir. 2001)).
This fact was observed by the court in litigation proceedings. See supra text accompanying note
150.

237

Under the Guidelines, market shares are calculated using the best indicator of the firms’ future
competitive significance, including dollar sales where firms are distinguished primarily by product
differentiation. GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 1.41. Though annual data are usually employed in
such an analysis, the Agency does often measure market shares over longer periods of time when
individual sales are large and infrequent. Id. This is such an instance, as contracts approximately span
a decade. See NCAA Membership Report, supra note 34, at 57 n.12; Alesia II, supra note 83.
238

These calculations were made from financial data derived from the information concerning both
Associations’ television broadcasting and marketing contracts. See Alesia II, supra note 83 (revealing
the terms of the MIBA’s contract with ESPN); NCAA Membership Report, supra note 34, at 57 n.12
(revealing the terms of the NCAA’s contract with CBS). Though a portion of the payment terms
under the MIBA’s contract are attributable to the Preseason NIT, and payments under the NCAA’s
contract are attributable to “other championship and marketing rights,” presumably the dominant
portion of each is attributable to their postseason basketball tournament rights. See Alesia II, supra
note 83; NCAA Membership Report, supra note 34, at 57 n.12. Ranges of calculations were based on
attributable portions of the MIBA and the NCAA contracts to their postseason basketball
tournaments, estimated at roughly 67-100% and 90-100%, respectively.
239

240

(.5)2 x (99.5)2 = 9900.50; (.3) 2 x (99.7) 2 = 9940.18

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 1.5. The highest possible HHI for any given market is 10,000, as a
completely monopolized market has only one participant, the monopolist, with 100% of the market.

241

242

Id. at § 1.51(c).

2006] NCAA: A LESSON IN CARTEL BEHAVIOR AND ANTITRUST REGULATION 51
be examined as potentially raising competitive concerns, based on analysis of the
remaining factors under the Guidelines.244
b. Potential Adverse Competitive Effects
Under this section of the Guidelines, the Agency would analyze the potential
adverse unilateral competitive effects of the merger to determine whether the NCAA
could find it profitable to unilaterally raise prices, suppress output, or otherwise
utilize market power.245 The probable existence of anti-competitive effect was
demonstrated in the prior analysis under § 1 of the Sherman Act with regard to only
a few rules promulgated by the NCAA—those directed at controlling the
participation of teams in the NIT.246 How much greater, then, is the potential
negative effect on competition should the two tournaments be placed entirely under
common ownership!
The potential for reduction in output of postseason games is clear now that
the NCAA has the ability to control, and thus the power to entirely eliminate, the
NIT. Also, by utilizing its market power to control the participation of tournament
teams, the NCAA could further increase prices of broadcast rights, concessions,
sponsorships, and event tickets.247 In addition, the consolidation of the two
tournaments would “preclude the emergence of a stronger rivalry between the
NCAA and NIT,”248 a rivalry that had the potential to grow had the MIBA prevailed
243

10,000 – 9,940 = 60; 10,000 – 9,900 = 100

244

See GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 1.51(c).

245 Id. at § 2.2. The Guidelines provide for analysis of the potential curbing of competition through
both “coordinated interaction,” where a merger enables remaining firms to more likely, more
successfully, or more completely act in concert to the detriment of consumers, and “unilateral
effects,” where the merged firm might profitably alter its behavior on its own by raising prices or
suppressing output. See id. at §§ 2.1-2.2. In this instance, however, the merger of the only existing
competitors renders any inquiry into potential coordinated interaction among sellers moot.
246

See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.

Letter from Diana Moss, Vice-President and Senior Fellow, Am. Antitrust Inst., to the Honorable
Thomas Barnett, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen. for Antitrust, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Antitrust Div. et
al. 2 (Sept. 12, 2005), available at http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/recent2/445.pdf [hereinafter Letter
from Diana Moss]. The American Antitrust Institute urged the DOJ, the FTC, and the State of New
York to carefully scrutinize the proposed settlement, positing that it would greatly harm consumers.
Id. at 1-2.
247

248

Id. at 2.
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in the litigation and the NCAA’s Postseason Rules been struck down. As a result,
men’s basketball teams have no options remaining with regard to participation in
postseason tournaments,249 and television networks have but one organization with
whom to deal in airing men’s basketball playoff games. The likelihood of these
considerable anticompetitive effects should convince the Agency to challenge the
acquisition.
c. Entry Analysis
Under the Merger Guidelines, “[a] merger is not likely to create or enhance . .
. or . . . facilitate” the exercise of market power if entry by new competitors is timely,
likely, and sufficient in magnitude to mitigate any anticompetitive effects; such a
merger is generally dismissed as raising no antitrust concern.250 However, antitrust
concern may indeed arise when applying this analysis to the case at hand.
Should the NCAA continue to control the only two postseason tournaments
with significant histories and followings and maintain its Postseason Rules, the
likelihood of another postseason tournament being established is extremely slim; the
alternative tournament would be left with teams possessing, at most, marginal talent.
Such a tournament would have difficulty earning a meaningful profit, and should it
manage to make money, indubitably the NCAA would expand its bracket scope to
capture it, as the Association has done in the past.251
An analysis of probable entry raises a related concern: the probable forced
exit of competitors in related markets. Once the NCAA is given a “green light” by
the government to eliminate competition in the postseason basketball market, it has
little incentive not to do the same in the market for preseason tournaments. The
Association might eventually replace independent tournaments with events over
which the NCAA could exert control and from which it could capture existing
profits.252

249

Id.

250

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 3.0.

251

See supra text accompanying notes 54-58.

252

See Letter from Diana Moss, supra note 247, at 3.
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d. Efficiencies
Acknowledging that many mergers and acquisitions generate significant
efficiencies and in doing so often benefit the economy, the Merger Guidelines
incorporate an examination of such efficiencies into the analytical process.253 The
Agency makes very clear, however, that it will consider only those efficiencies that
are “merger-specific” (unlikely to be accomplished in absence of the merger),
substantiated (not vague, speculative or unverifiable), and do not result from
anticompetitive reductions in output or service.254
As previously noted, the likelihood of establishing efficiencies sufficient to
justify the acquisition is very low, since the efficiencies asserted by the parties only
vaguely refer to leveraging the NCAA’s assets to improve the quality of the NIT.255
Of particular insight in the assessment of the NCAA’s transaction are the Guidelines’
own words: “Efficiencies almost never justify a merger to monopoly . . . .”256 The
Agency also observed that “those [claimed efficiencies] relating to procurement,
management, or capital cost are less likely to be merger-specific or substantial, or
may not be cognizable for other reasons.”257 If the potential adverse competitive
effect of the merger is great, as indicated by the earlier stages in the analysis, then the
proffered efficiencies that are merger-specific, substantiated, and not the result of
anticompetitive action by the merged entities, if any, must be even greater in order to
carry the day.258 Such a finding by the Agency is highly improbable.
e. Failure and Exiting Assets
The Merger Guidelines provide a narrow exception for a merger that cannot
pass muster under sections 1-4, yet is unlikely to create, enhance, or facilitate the
exercise of market power because “imminent failure” of one of the firms would
result in its assets exiting the relevant market.259 Since, as previously noted,260 the
253

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 4.

254

Id.

255

See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text.

256

GUIDELINES, supra note 26, at § 4.
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NIT was operating under a lucrative contract, this exception is unavailable to the
Associations.
Pursuant to the analysis laid out in its own Merger Guidelines, the DOJ
seems to have ample reason to challenge the settlement under § 7 of the Clayton Act.
Should the government decline to challenge the settlement, the acquisition might
never be subjected to scrutiny under antitrust law.261 Yet, to date no such challenge
of the settlement by the DOJ has been announced. The following section briefly
addresses potential reasons behind the DOJ’s failure to challenge the settlement, as
well as probable short-term and long-term implications of this oversight.
IV. AFTERMATH – REFUSING TO CALL THE FOUL
A. Possible Explanations for Inaction
Why has the DOJ not challenged the acquisition of the NIT by the NCAA?
Perhaps it is simply because the administrative agency has not yet had time to
conduct a thorough analysis of the acquisition under its Guidelines and is reluctant
to announce the challenge until it has had the opportunity to do so. Although the
Merger Guidelines were designed to reflect the aim of § 7 of the Clayton Act—to
halt anticompetitive mergers in their incipiency262—the DOJ has no time constraints
within which to bring its claim.263 It is also conceivable that the DOJ has conducted
extensive analysis under the Guidelines and has come to the conclusion that the
overall effect of the acquisition will not be adverse to competition; the analysis of the
issues above, however, weigh against that explanation.
There are several other possibilities worthy of succinct mention. First, the
excitement generated by March Madness and other college athletic contests may
leave federal employees with the same appreciation for the NCAA’s role in providing
these contests as that held by the rest of the populous—many of whom devote
nearly one-twelfth of their lives to watching tournament play each year.264 As the
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See Robinson, supra note 195 (“[T]he government can challenge a transaction at any time, even after
it has been consummated.”).
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Though hard to imagine at such high levels of government, the strength of this appreciation is
considerable amongst those who possess it, even those holding “neutral” positions in our legal
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ultimate consumers of the product, those analysts might like the idea of having a
single national postseason tournament; the temptation might be great to let the issue
slip through the proverbial bureaucratic cracks.
Second, the fact that this particular acquisition was accomplished through a
court settlement could also explain the DOJ’s silence. As noted in response to
concern over the use of settlements as anticompetitive tools in the pharmaceutical
industry,265 the policy in this country has been to favor settlements.266 Settlements
are valued because they conserve “judicial resources and often yield quick
resolutions.”267 They can “reduce costs” and even “engender competition.”268
However, the public interest must not be ignored at the settlement table.269
In the case at hand, the public interest in promoting competition must be
addressed with respect to the NCAA’s settlement agreement to acquire the NIT.
Because the agreement is a private contract, this can only be accomplished through

system. The appreciation for college athletics and the NCAA as an organization may even have been
an influential factor prompting Justice White, a 1937 All-American selection in football when playing
for the University of Colorado, to write a spirited dissent in Board of Regents, defending the NCAA’s
price-fixing television plan because it legitimately “reflect[ed] the NCAA’s fundamental policy of
preserving amateurism and integrating athletics and education.” See Jerry Garau, The Effect of NCAA
v. Board of Regents on the Power of the NCAA to Impose Television Sanctions, 18 IND. L. REV. 937, 946, 946
n.69 (quoting NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 125 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting)).
265 Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, the first manufacturer of a generic drug can obtain FDA approval
to enter the market for a particular drug before the (branded drug) patent expires. Mark L. Kovner et
al., Applying the Noerr Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation Settlements, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 609
(2003). Such an applicant can trigger patent litigation by filing a form with the FDA claiming the
branded drug’s patent is invalid or is not infringed by the generic drug. Id. Sometimes that litigation
is settled in what is seen as the buying off of generic firms by the patent holder in exchange for a
share of the “monopoly rents” from the patented product. Id. at 610.

Sheila F. Anthony, Comm’r, Fed. Trade Comm’n, Riddles and Lessons from the Prescription Drug
Wars: Antitrust Implications of Certain Types of Agreements Involving Intellectual Property (June 1,
2000), http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/anthony/sfip000601.htm (last visited Oct. 2, 2006).
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judicial review of the purchase agreement, which in turn requires the action of the
enforcing administrative agencies.270
B. Implications
The NCAA and the MIBA leaders have hailed the acquisition as “a victory
without defeat,” stressing that the purchase will result in a stronger NIT with its
tradition and heritage safely preserved, and providing the NCAA with the
“opportunity to better . . . build on the status of the . . . NIT events.”271 When a
reporter questioned the intent behind the purchase and noted the irony in that,
“instead of killing [the NIT,] . . . [the NCAA] has just bought it;” NYU President
John Sexton responded sharply on behalf of the MIBA, saying “I’m very allergic to
being judgmental.”272
Those antitrust scholars not sharing President Sexton’s allergy must,
however, look beyond the glorious plans for the NIT broadcast by the
Associations—one that now controls its sole competitor and the other that just
accepted a huge check in exchange for its interest in the business. The consequences
that could realistically be expected to result from this shift of control, both in the
next few years and beyond, must be examined.
1. Short Term
It is safe to assume that the NCAA will initiate no great change in the
operation of the postseason NIT tournament in the next several years, although the
tournaments will be rescheduled to avoid televising conflicts273 and the NCAA might
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See section IV(a)(iii), supra.

These comments were made by NYU President John Sexton on behalf of the MIBA and the
NCAA President Myles Brand. THE NCAA NEWS, supra note 1.
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273 Reg P. Wydeven, NCAA skirts monopoly accusation with $40M NIT buyout, APPLETON POSTCRESCENT, Aug. 27, 2005, at 12.
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revisit its “two-in-four rule” as a result of the changing competitive scene.274 The
lack of any new entrants to this monopoly market is also predictable.275
Several factors support this conclusion: (1) ESPN’s contract with the MIBA
covers the tournament through 2010,276 and some negotiation regarding the
preservation of the NIT was probably necessary to ensure the transition of legal
ownership; (2) the NCAA made numerous public statements indicating its intent to
preserve the NIT277 and would not want the public to question the Association’s
integrity; and (3) eliminating the postseason NIT in the near future might create the
appearance that the NCAA indeed intended to eliminate its competition by acquiring
the tournament, and thus could prompt the DOJ to challenge the acquisition under §
7 of the Clayton Act. Hence, the NCAA has great motivation to continue operating
the postseason NIT running, for now.
2. Long Term
In later years, however, the NCAA might change its course of action. Once
the ESPN contract has expired, sufficient time has passed to dull the public’s
memory, and the MIBA has long since dissolved,278 the NCAA will have shed some
of its prior incentives to continue operating the postseason NIT. A new ESPN
contract for television and marketing rights for the preseason NIT could be
renegotiated without drawing much attention. Well-publicized, “newly discovered”
benefits to all involved, such as reduced operating expenses on the part of the
NCAA and the excitement of having a “single national championship,”279 could
dispel the public’s suspicion of the NCAA’s credibility regarding its prior assertions
of an intent to preserve the NIT. Finally, because the MIBA would no longer exist,
the acquisition could not easily be rescinded at that point. Further, the tournament
274 THE NCAA NEWS, supra note 1.
The “two-in-four rule” prohibits Division I teams from
participation in more than two exempted events in any four year period (the preseason NIT is one
such exempted event). Id.
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278 The MIBA’s dissolution as a basketball entity soon after consummation of the transaction is
currently expected to occur. Katz, supra note 106.
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could not be easily sold to anyone else, as an operator of a postseason tournament
would still be subject to the NCAA’s Postseason Rules, which drastically reduce the
potential profitability of tournament operation.280 Thus, any later challenge to the
acquisition might lack a suitable remedy.
The NCAA’s acquisition of the NIT may very well have sounded the deathknell for its postseason tournament. Whether that possibility is an improper
“judgmental” response or a prophetic vision can only be revealed by the impartial
verdict of the passage of time.
V. CONCLUSION – BOX SCORES & POST GAME HIGHLIGHTS
From its competitive maneuvers alleged to have begun in the 1940s281 to the
acquisition consummated not long ago, the NCAA has managed to oust its long-time
rival, the MIBA, in the arena of postseason Division I men’s basketball tournaments.
Whether it chooses to maintain the postseason NIT indefinitely as a “loser’s bracket”
of sorts, or to eliminate it entirely, one thing is certain: for the time being, and likely
forever if the DOJ does not challenge the acquisition, $56.5 million has rid the
NCAA of the only obstacle in its path to complete monopolization of the
postseason tournament market. That prospect, along with the lucrative television
contract inherited by the Association,282 renders this transaction a decisive “W” for
the NCAA.
The MIBA also goes home with a win, taking the $56.5 million, relinquishing
the responsibility of running a tournament that brings in only a small fraction of that
amount on an annual basis, and eliminating the risk of losing the litigation and being
forced to absorb its enormous cost.
The only potential losers in this game are certain NCAA member schools’
basketball teams that might prefer a choice of postseason tournaments, and
consumers of the product, including fans, broadcasters and marketers of the
tournaments, who face potentially higher prices with the NCAA in complete control
of the market.
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Though properly subject to review under three different antitrust laws,283
the result of this transaction—a completely monopolized market with significant
entry barriers—is in direct opposition to the fundamental principle that underlies
each law: prevention of the acquisition or exercise of market power that would
eradicate the inherent benefits of competitive markets to the detriment of
consumers. To say that this outcome reeks of irony is an understatement indeed.
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